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In the field of civil rights, there are broad, cumulative remedies
available to the aggrieved party. The fabric of these remedies is an
amalgam of various and varying statutes, judicial holdings, admin-
istrative determinations and arbitral awards. The following article
attempts a distillation of current law-much of which is further
complicated by conflicting decisions.
I. COVERAGE
The laws covering fair employment practices were enacted to
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combat the rising tide of discrimination against minorities and
women in industry.
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over
the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such quali-
fications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and
sex become irrelevant.'
This interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 the
most significant of the fair employment legislation, has become a
landmark decision applicable to laws subsequently enacted to elimi-
nate invidious discriminatory practices. The effect of Title VII and
subsequent statutes and regulations-both federal and state-has
been to create a maze of overlapping procedures and remedies.
Management is well-advised to consider itself covered by fair em-
ployment laws and to review its employment practices in light of the
material contained in this article.
Title VII prohibits employment practices based upon race, color,
sex, national origin and religion.' The statute covers all employees
(including executives) of an employer in an "industry affecting com-
merce" which has 15 or more employees for each working day for 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.4 Originally
applicable only to the private sector, Title VII was amended in 1972
to include public employees.' Unions and their hiring halls as well
as employment agencies are also covered.'
"Affecting commerce" is the broadest term used by Congress in
its regulation of employment practices. It encompasses a broader
reach than the Wage-Hour Law which speaks in terms of employers
"engaged in commerce" or "in the production of goods for com-
merce". 7 Any company that satisfies the standard of 15 employees
for 20 payroll weeks should presume that it is covered by Title VII.
All individual operations (even if individually incorporated) are
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974).
3. Id. § 2000e-2(a) to -2(d).
4. Id. § 2000e(b).
5. Id. § 2000e(a).
6. Id. § 2000e(c)-(e).
7. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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covered if they are part of an integrated enterprise which meets the
minimum number.' However, a company employing fewer than 15
employees, though not covered by Title VII, is still subject to most
state or local fair employment laws.' Likewise, failure to meet the
minimum number of employees does not bar a discrimination claim
based upon another federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.10
II. RACE DISCRIMINATION
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based upon race
or color. This prohibition encompasses discrimination not only in
hiring but in every condition of employment." Section 703(a) of
the statute makes it unlawful for any employer to fail to hire an in-
dividual or to discharge an employee because of race or color.12
Likewise, an employer may not consider an employee's race in de-
termining compensation or any other term, condition, or privilege
of employment. 3 Approximately two-thirds of the states have also
enacted fair employment practice laws." In addition, the Civil
Rights Acts, passed after the Civil War, are of particular signifi-
8. This applies even if one individual operation has fewer than the minimum number of
employees. Some of the factors used in determining the degree of integration are the degree
of centralized control of personnel policies and labor relations and the degree of interchange
of employees. See Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972). A
Tennessee district court has refused to treat two corporations of a parent-subsidiary relation-
ship as one, and, therefore, the subsidiary was exempt from Title VII coverage. Hassell v.
Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), aft'd, 454 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972).
The court observed that the affairs of the two companies were generally handled separately.
For example, the parent corporation bore no responsibility for the debts of the subsidiary
corporation.
9. See note 14 infra. For a discussion of state laws on age discrimination see Annot., 29
A.L.R.3d 1407 (1970).
10. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970), covers
all employees (including executives) of an employer who has 20 or more employees for each
working day for 20 or more calendar weeks in either the current or preceding year. Id. § 630(b).
For a complete discussion of the Act see section IV. infra. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), is applicable to all employers regardless of the number of employees.
11. Section 703(a)(2) makes it an unlawful employment practice "to limit, segregate, or
classify" employees in a manner which would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise affect his employment status because of race. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1974). Similar prohibitions are applicable to labor organizations.
Id. § 2000e-2(c)(2).
12. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
13. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
14. For a list of states with fair employment practice laws see Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1138
(1955).
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cance in the area of racial discrimination. The most significant of
these is the Civil Rights Act of 1866,15 which, inter alia, gives "all
persons" the same right "to make and enforce contracts . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens." This contractual right has been inter-
preted to apply to the employment relationship regardless of
whether a collective bargaining agreement and/or private contract
exists. The courts have generally interpreted the substantive provi-
sions of section 1981 to be similar, if not identical, to the protection
of Title VII; 1 yet section 1981 may afford a number of important
procedural advantages over a Title VII suit.17
In addition to these statutes, Executive Order 1124618 prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin
by government contractors and subcontractors. The Secretary of
Labor may, in his discretion, grant an exemption where the annual
value of the contract is $10,000 or less. The Order specifically re-
quires that an offending contractor take affirmative action to ensure
the elimination of any discriminatory practice. 9 The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and many courts have
taken the position that Title VII also requires affirmative action."0
There has never been any question that overt racial discrimina-
tion by an employer is unlawful. In the past, such patent discrimi-
nation was evidenced by a refusal to hire members of minority races
15. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. The modem counterparts of section 1 of
the 1866 Act are 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), protecting the right "to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold and convey real and personal property" and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), protecting
other enumerated rights including the right "to make and enforce contracts."
16. See, e.g., Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972).
17. For example, a Title VII suit may not be brought in the courts without first having gone
through the EEOC procedures, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1974), while a suit under section
1981 may be directly initiated in the courts. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 95 S. Ct.
1716 (1975); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Macklin v. Spector Freight
Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438
F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 911 (1970).
18. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974).
19. Id.
20. Section 706(g) of Title VII authorizes the federal courts to enjoin unlawful employment
practices and to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(g) (1974).
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or to place or promote minority employees outside of the least desir-
able job levels. But the fair employment law has now evolved in
response to more subtle questions of discrimination. It is no longer
necessary to show that the employer intended to discriminate.
Rather, the law has focused on facially neutral employment policies
-neutral in that, on the surface, they appear to be equally applica-
ble to both whites and minorities.
For example, an employer who requires a high school diploma as
a prerequisite to employment runs afoul of Title VII.21 Though an
apparently neutral employment policy, the United States Supreme
Court unanimously struck it down. The Court found such a policy
was unlawful because the high school requirement was not signifi-
cantly related to the successful performance of the job and it dispro-
portionately affected black employees. The Court clearly stated
that Title VII was not limited to intended discrimination:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . .
[w]as to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.22
Since that decision, a number of employment practices, apparently
neutral on their face, have been found to unlawfully discriminate on
the basis of race.
A. TESTING
The Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures issued by the
EEOC define the term "test" to encompass not only the traditional
paper-and-pencil test, but any type of job qualification used as a
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. Id. at 429-30.
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 et seq. (1975). The United States Supreme Court stated that a
certain amount of deference is to be accorded the EEOC guidelines:
The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to
great deference. . . . Since the Act and its legislative history support the Commis-
sion's construction, this affords good reason to treat the Guidelines as expressing the
will of Congress. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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basis for any employment decision. 24 Thus, the definition includes
any specific requirement concerning personal history, education,
work history, biographical information, or interviewer's rating
scales which could be used to disqualify an applicant from employ-
ment or promotion. 25 The landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.26 established that a test or job qualification would be
racially discriminatory when applied in a job formerly held by
whites only if shown to be not significantly related to successful job
performance, while also operating to disqualify Negroes at a sub-
stantially higher rate than whites. 27 Even though such a test or job
qualification is administered without an intent to discriminate, it
remains unlawful if it fails to be job-related and adversely affects
minorities. 28 It should be noted that the alleged discriminatee must
prove that the test was the basis of his being denied promotion or
employment, even though the employer makes no showing that the
test was related to the position sought.29
Under the EEOC Guidelines0 a test or job qualification is vali-
dated by evidence in the form of statistical data demonstrating that
the qualification is predictive of or significantly correlated with
important elements of work behavior relevant to the job.3 ' In addi-
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975).
25. Id.
26. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
27. Id. at 426.
28. A disproportionate impact is one which could not randomly arise. Statistical differ-
ences less dramatic than those involved in Griggs may be statistically nonrandom. To deter-
mine randomness, statisticians ask whether an observed difference in any given sample is
greater than that which would be expected on the basis of mere chance or probability. For
example, in Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d
1167 (2d Cir. 1972), black and Spanish-surnamed candidates for promotion achieved a 31.4%
pass rate on the written examination, whereas whites achieved a 44.3% success rate. The court
held that such a discrepancy represented a disproportionate impact solely attributable to
racial factors. The court strongly relied upon testimony of a mathematician who stated that
the probability of the thirteen-point difference being a chance result not related to the factor
of race was less than one in one billion. Id. at 212.
It has been relatively easy to demonstrate that a job qualification has a disproportionate
impact on minorities. As noted by the District of Columbia Circuit:
In every one of the more than twenty reported opinions involving standardized
aptitude tests . . . , the final disposition has included a conclusion of racially dispro-
portionate impact. Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 983 n.52 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (em-
phasis added).
29. Woods v. North American Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1973).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 et seq. (1975).
31. Id. § 1607.4.
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tion, to be permissible, the person utilizing the test must also show
that alternative procedures are unavailable for use.2 In Griggs, the
Court held that deference was to be accorded these determina-
tions.3
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,34 two tests given to employees
at the company's paper mill were found materially defective under
the EEOC's guidelines for determining job-relatedness. In Albe-
marle Paper, the employer had undertaken to validate the job-
relatedness of its testing program by hiring a consulting psycholo-
gist. He analyzed the correlation between the test scores of employ-
ees and an independent ranking of employees by supervisors, find-
ing the test to be predictive of job performance." The Court found,
however, that Albemarle had not considered the particular skills
needed in the tested job groups. The study dealt only with job-
experienced white workers and focused on the jobs near the top of
the various lines of progression, while the tests were given to new
job applicants, largely inexperienced, and often non-white. In addi-
tion, the "standard" against which test scores were compared-
subjective supervisorial rankings-was too vague to determine
whether the company actually considered job-relatedness. 6 Thus,
while the test might be valid for one select group of employees, it
would not necessarily measure minimal qualifications of lower level
employees.
According to the Supreme Court, a test or job qualification which
disproportionately affects minorities is valid only if the standard
can be proven to be a reasonable measure of job performance. 3 The
more general concept, therefore, is that any employment practice
which disproportionately affects minorities is valid only if such
practice is necessary to the operation of the employer's business.
The courts have, from the employer's vantage point, been very strict
in applying this defense of business necessity. For instance, in
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,38 necessity connoted "an
32. Id. § 1607.3.
33. See note 23 supra.
34. 95 S.Ct. 2362 (1975).
35. Id. at 2377.
36. Id. at 2379-80.
37. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971). See text accompanying notes 26-
28 supra.
38. 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
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irresistible demand," meaning that the job requirements were es-
sential to the successful operation of the task. In Bethlehem Steel,
the employer claimed that alteration of the seniority system to rem-
edy past discrimination would destroy the efficiency and safety of
the plant. The company feared that the advantage of rate retention
and seniority carry-over, made a part of the court's transfer pro-
gram, would lead to a wholesale depopulation of several depart-
ments, that the injury rate would increase on dangerous, skilled
jobs, and that preferential treatment of some employees would re-
sult in labor unrest; in short, the increased cost of production caused
by this scheme would render the plant uncompetitive. The Second
Circuit characterized this argument as substantial, but not persua-
sive. To qualify under the business necessity defense, the discrimi-
natory practice must do more than merely serve legitimate manage-
ment functions. Unless this were true, the court reasoned, all but
the most blatantly discriminatory plans would be excused even if
they perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. In order to be
upheld as a business necessity, the discriminatory practice must be
essential to the goals of safety and efficiency of operation without a
reasonable alternative that has less discriminatory effects. 9
Similarly, when the Fourth Circuit ordered the dismantling of a
departmental seniority system because it represented a continuing
discriminatory barrier to black employees, the court rejected the
employer's assertion that the departmental system was a business
necessity because employees would perform a job more efficiently
if they had prior experience at other jobs within the same depart-
ment." The Fourth Circuit perhaps took an even stronger position
than the Second Circuit in Bethlehem Steel by requiring not only a
showing of business necessity, but convincing proof that there was
no acceptable alternative with a lesser impact on minorities."
In contrast to these rigid definitions, a Missouri district court has
upheld, as a business necessity, an employer's practice of refusing
to hire job applicants with records of criminal conviction, even
39. Accord, United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1971).
40. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
41. Id. at 798.
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though this policy had a disparate impact on minorities.42 The court
relied on the testimony of an industrial psychologist which showed
at least 50% of those convicted would be convicted again. The court
noted that the concerns of the company, i.e., prevention of theft of
company property and cargo, refusal to comply with employer's
directives, and employment disruption caused by recidivism, were
factors relevant to the efficiency and safety of the company's busi-
ness and, therefore, established that the policies were based upon
business necessity.
The Tenth Circuit, in upholding stringent employment qualifica-
tions for airline flight officers, enunciated a test which should be a
realistic guideline for any industry:
When a job requires a small amount of skill and training and the
consequences of hiring an unqualified applicant are insignificant, the
courts should examine closely any pre-employment standard or cri-
teria which discriminate against minorities. In such a case, the em-
ployer should have a heavy burden to demonstrate to the court's
satisfaction that his employment criteria are job-related. On the
other hand, when the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and
the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified ap-
plicant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter bur-
den to show that his employment criteria are job-related.43
B. SENIORITY WITH RESPECT TO LAYOFF, PROMOTION AND TRANSFER
The role of seniority in employment situations is perhaps the most
sensitive issue in the administration of fair employment laws, in
part because of its potentially direct impact on white male employ-
ees. The courts are presented with two conflicting interests, each
demanding attention. On the one hand, Title VII demands equal
employment opportunity today but on the other counsels that a
bona fide seniority system and the expectations for promotion, ad-
vancement and job security that it creates are entitled to some
deference.44 The key statutory provision is section 703(h) which pro-
vides in part:
42. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 381 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1974). For a discussion of a
related problem involving consultation of arrest records see section II.C. infra.
43. Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972).
44. See, e.g., Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 982-83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919 (1969).
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system
45
An employer who has engaged in discrimination by segregating
departments or job titles on the basis of race or sex can be required
to alter its departmental or job seniority" procedure to a system of
plant or establishment seniority" in order that promotions, layoffs,
and transfers be governed by the total length of service with the
employer. The first case to require this merger was handed down in
the Eastern District of Virginia.48 The court found that prior to 1966,
the employer in question had discriminated in hiring by restricting
blacks to those departments with the least desirable and lowest
paying jobs; after 1966, the employer had remedied this practice
and was hiring blacks for all positions. But the impact of prior
discrimination continued after 1966. A black employee with ten
years of establishment seniority in a lower-paying department who
transferred to another previously all-white department would as-
sume an entry level position with less departmental seniority than
a white employee with less establishment seniority. The difference
in departmental seniority would reflect the period of prior
segregation of departments. The court struck down this system and
created a new one in which establishment seniority would largely
determine transfer and promotion. The court had little difficulty in
refusing deference to the existing seniority plan, observing that sec-
tion 703(h) of Title VII exempts only bona fide seniority systems.
The court remarked: "Obviously one characteristic of a bona fide
seniority system must be lack of prior discrimination."4
The Fifth Circuit, relying upon this decision, has also mandated
the replacement of departmental seniority with job seniority. 0 As
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (1674).
46. Departmental or job seniority establishes that promotions and layoffs are made accord-
ing to the length of service in a particular department or a particular job.
47. Plant or establishment seniority is determined by length of service with the employer
at its plant or establishment.
48. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
49. Id. at 517.
50. Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1969).
[Vol. 10:209
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with testing requirements,5 a bona fide seniority system requires
more than one facially neutral with "the inevitable effect of tying
the system to the past ... *"52 How much more is required to undo
the effects of past discrimination becomes the crucial question. Two
competing theories were offered as answers by the court. The "free-
dom now" theory requires a complete purge of the effects of prior
discrimination. Black employees would immediately be given the
jobs that, but for discrimination, their greater establishment senior-
ity would entitle them to hold. The Fifth Circuit noted that under
this theory, allowing whites with less establishment seniority to
continue in their present jobs would constitute a further act of dis-
crimination. 3 The "rightful place" theory entails less drastic ef-
fects. It also emphasizes establishment seniority, but only in the
future selection for vacant jobs. Looking to the purpose and history
of Title VII, the court found a prohibition of future job decisions
based upon a system that "locks in" prior segregation. But incum-
bent employees were not to be bumped out of present positions in
order to alleviate past discrimination. 4 To transform a job seniority
plan to an establishment or company-wide seniority system does not
change the requirement that individuals be qualified for the partic-
ular position. The touchstone at all times is business necessity.55
The effect of most decisions, however, has been that job or depart-
ment seniority is not essential enough to the safety and efficiency
of the employer's operation to allow for its perpetuation of discrimi-
natory effects.
Use of an establishment seniority system appears to remove ade-
quately the effects of prior segregation by jobs or departments. But
does Title VII require that an establishment seniority system be
altered when a layoff, necessary for economic reasons, dispropor-
tionately affects newly-hired minorities? Two circuit courts have
recently rejected such a challenge. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 6 the company had utilized a "last hired, first fired" senior-
51. See section ll.A. supra.
52. 416 F.2d at 988.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 989. See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
56. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1975) (No. 74-1064).
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ity system57 for all employees. Although blacks had been seeking
employment as early as 1947, no blacks had been hired prior to 1964.
In 1965, severe layoffs occurred, affecting all employees with less
than ten years seniority, and as a consequence, every black em-
ployee was laid off. The black employees contended that this senior-
ity system perpetuated the effects of past discrimination because
blacks were laid off before and recalled after certain whites who had
greater establishment seniority. In rejecting this contention and
upholding the seniority system, the court distinguished a system of
establishment seniority from one which operates by job or depart-
ment."8 Under a job or departmental system, continuing restrictions
on transfer and promotion create unearned or artificial expectations
of preference which favor white employees over minority employees
having a greater length of service. Establishment seniority on the
other hand, merely preserves the earned expectations of long-service
employees. Such a system does not of itself perpetuate the effects
of past discrimination.59
In Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local Unions," the
employer, the unions and the EEOC had entered into a written
conciliation agreement requiring that affirmative action be taken by
the establishment. The company and the unions were to implement
a program to increase the proportion of minorities and females in
various job titles so that "at the end of five years the proportion of
females and minority group employees would approximate the pro-
portion of those groups in the relevant labor market.""1 Six months
later, the employer announced that economic considerations com-
pelled a layoff which eventually affected 400 employees. Each of the
seven unions with which the employer had collective bargaining
agreements required strict adherence by the employer to the senior-
ity provisions of the collective bargaining agreements. The EEOC
responded to the company's layoff plans, which would dispropor-
tionately affect minorities, by indicating that a layoff governed
57. For a general discussion of this practice see Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and
Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1544 (1975); Note, The Survival of "Last Hired, First Fired" under
Title VII and Section 1981, 6 LoyoLA U.L.J. 386 (1975).
58. 502 F.2d at 1318.
59. Id. at 1320.
60. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 704.
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by seniority alone would violate the provisions of the conciliation
agreement.
The employer sought a declaratory judgment to determine how it
should implement the necessary layoff. The Third Circuit, reversing
the district court, ruled that strict seniority should be followed. The
court observed that the conciliation agreement referred exclusively
to the hiring of minority employees, and that once hired they were
intended to be subject to all terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ments, including layoff by seniority."2 The court further noted that
the conciliation agreement required the company to use its "best
efforts" to increase the percentage of minority employees; those
"best efforts" did not include modification of the seniority system
to implement a layoff." The court relied on the legislative history
of Title VII to find that employment rights could be effected pro-
spectively only. Section 703(h) required that it have no effect on
already established seniority rights.64
A contrary view was expressed by the district court in Watkins v.
Steelworkers Local 2369.5 In Watkins, with the exception of two
blacks hired during World War II, only whites were hired until 1965.
Beginning in 1971 and continuing through 1974, economic condi-
tions required a substantial cutback in employment which was im-
plemented according to the seniority provisions of the labor con-
tract. Layoffs were so extensive that they reached employees hired
as early as 1951. Since recall was in reverse order of layoff, the
company was not expected to employ another black for many years.
62. Id. at 702.
63. Id. at 703.
64. Id. at 707, quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (daily ed. April 8, 1964). The interpretive
Memorandum of Senators Clark and Case, floor managers for Title VII in the Senate, pro-
vided in part:
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result
has an all-white force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would
be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be
obliged - or indeed, permitted - to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer
Negroes for future vacancies, or once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority
rights at the expense of white workers hired earlier. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (daily ed.
April 8, 1964) (emphasis added).
The rationale applied in this instance is identical to that applied in Local 189 v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1969), to decide the question of
retroactive seniority regarding promotion. See text accompanying notes 357-58 infra.
65. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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The district court modified the seniority and layoff provisions to
ensure the employment of blacks. The court-ordered modification
provided that: (a) without laying off any employees, black employ-
ees should be recalled until the racial balance of the work force was
equal to that which existed when the last employee was hired; and
(b) future layoffs must be allocated so .that the ratio of blacks to the
total work force remained constant. The modification was reversed
by the Fifth Circuit, however.
Applying the rationale of Griggs, a layoff system though facially
neutral in practice which perpetuates under adverse economic con-
ditions the prior policy of discrimination would appear to run afoul
of Title VII. 8 This rationale was qualified by the Fifth Circuit in
Watkins to make such a layoff system violative of neither section
1981 nor Title VII when certain conditions are met: (1) the present
hiring practices are non-discriminatory and have been non-
discriminatory for at least ten years; and (2) the system is of long-
standing use and adopted without the intent to discriminate. The
unqualified approval of an establishment seniority layoff system, as
found in the Jersey Central Power and Wisconsin Steel decisions,
appears to misconstrue the decision in Griggs.
C. CONSULTATION OF ARREST RECORDS
Consulting arrest records as distinguished from records of convic-
tion, is a dramatic example of a neutral, if not advisable, employ-
ment policy which nonetheless can reveal a discriminatory employ-
ment practice. In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.,' the parties stip-
ulated that the company's decision not to hire an applicant was
predicated upon his statement that he had been arrested fourteen
times, without regard to any convictions. The employer's policy of
disqualifying persons who had been frequently arrested was neu-
trally applied, i.e., it was enforced without reference to race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. Yet the Ninth Circuit ruled that
reliance upon arrest records was discriminatory because arrest re-
cords are not an accurate indicator of job performance. Arrests,
unlike convictions, do not constitute proof of any wrong-doing. Ac-
66. See, e.g., Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 164 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
67. 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
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cording to the court, there was no evidence to support the conclusion
that individuals who have been arrested on a number of occasions,
but never convicted, would perform less efficiently or less honestly
than other employees. Since the evidence for the area indicated that
blacks were arrested more frequently than whites, such a "neutral"
employment policy in fact discriminated against black applicants.
Statistics demonstrated that the requirement operated to bar jobs
to black applicants in far greater proportion than white applicants.
The employer had to show a reasonable business purpose for con-
tinuing to ask prospective employees about their arrest records and
this was not done.68
D. HmRNG BY "WORD-OF-MOUTH"
If a work force contains virtually no minority groups, it is
discriminatory to rely primarily upon existing employees to refer
new prospects. 9 Such a policy of hiring is found to perpetuate the
existing racial imbalance as much as any seniority system or testing
requirement. The courts reason that with a predominately white
work force, it is reasonably expected that a system of recruitment
by "word-of-mouth" will produce mostly white applicants. Existing
white employees would tend to recruit and recommend their own
family, friends and neighbors who are likely to be of the same race.
Such a recruitment procedure obviously perpetuates the absence of
minorities.
E. SUJEcrIvE EVALUATION AND WAGE DETERMINATION BY
SUPERVISORS
Just as hiring systems dependent upon white employees are
viewed with skepticism, so also are promotion systems which make
the advancement of blacks dependent upon recommendations from
whites. In Rowe v. General Motors Corp. ,70 the Fifth Circuit com-
mented that black employees could not reasonably "expect non-
discriminatory action" from such a system. The promotion system
in Rowe was perhaps an extreme of subjectivity. A recommendation
from the foreman was indispensable to promotion. The foremen,
68. Id. at 632.
69. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 427 (8th Cir. 1970).
70. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
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however, were given no written instructions or standards to use. In
addition, employees were not notified of the promotion opportuni-
ties or the qualifications necessary for the jobs. Statistics revealed
that the foreman positions were occupied almost exclusively by
whites and that past use of the system caused a great disparity in
employment opportunities for blacks.7" While striking down the pol-
icy, the court qualified its decision leaving room for an evaluation
process with less subjectivity or more safeguards against discrimina-
tory use.7"
Likewise, discretionary fixing of wage rates will be closely scruti-
nized for evidence of discrimination. Such discrimination was found
in United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.," where wage deter-
minations for apprentice mechanics were left to the discretion of the
shop superintendent. The system was struck down because its un-
fettered discretion was a ready vehicle for discriminatory abuse.
F. GROOMING REQUIREMENTS
The company's rules with respect to grooming must take into
account racial differences. In at least one instance, the EEOC has
ruled that an employer engaged in an unlawful employment prac-
tice by discharging a black employee whose Afro-American hair
style did not conform to the company's grooming standards.74 The
Commission stated that the company's grooming policy, that hair
be neither bushy nor extend beyond the ears, did not take into
account physical and cultural characteristics attributable to race;
the application of this policy to all employees adversely affected
black employees because of their different hair texture. Moreover,
the Commission observed that the wearing of an Afro-American hair
style had been appropriated as a cultural symbol of black Ameri-
cans of both sexes. The evidence indicated that the company did not
uniformly apply its grooming policies to all employees. White em-
ployees who wore beards in violation of the stated grooming policy
had not even been reprimanded.
71. Id. at 358-59.
72. See also Newman v. Avco Corp., 7 F.E.P. Cases 385 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), subsequent
order, 380 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
73. 7 F.E.P. Cases 710 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
74. EEOC Decision No. 71-2444, 1971 CCH EEOC Dec. 716240. See also Ramsey v.
Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
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Where a grooming policy has been applied to all employees indis-
criminately, no violation has been found. Thus a bus company did
not improperly discharge a black male driver for refusing to comply
with a regulation requiring drivers to be clean-shaven and prohibit-
ing them from wearing their hair long, since the regulation was
invoked against white drivers as well.7 1 On the other hand, a school
board's regulations restricting the grooming habits of teachers with
respect to moustaches, sideburns, and beards was held to "create
an arbitrary and capricious classification, devoid of logic and ration-
ality, and plainly offend both substantive due process and equal
protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 7 Such
grooming regulations are being extensively challenged by whites as
well as blacks on grounds apart from Title VII.7
G. PRESENCE OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF RACIAL HOSTILITY
The employer has a duty to maintain a work atmosphere free of
racial hostility. In Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital,
Inc.," a Kentucky district court awarded back pay and attorneys'
fees to a black employee who had been discharged for her "inabil-
ity to 'get along' with her co-workers." In fact, she had been ha-
rassed by a co-worker with racial epithets. The court stated that
while no employer is responsible for the personal intent of its em-
ployees to resort to racial prejudice, it does have a duty to take
appropriate action once overt racial mistreatment is apparent. Ap-
propriate action is not the discharge of the victimized employee.
H. REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
Reverse discrimination is claimed in the case where whites or
males are the victims of preferential treatment programs. In order
to establish a cause of action for reverse discrimination, the com-
plainant's allegations must show the same facts for a prima facie
case as required of a black,7 namely that (1) the applicant applied
for and was qualified for a job which an employer sought to fill; (2)
75. Brown v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 10 F.E.P. Cases 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
76. Conard v. Goolsby, 350 F. Supp. 713, 718 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
77. See, e.g., Lansdale v. Tyler Jr. College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972).
78. 4 F.E.P. Cases 33 (W.D. Ky. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
79. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also text accom-
panying note 466 infra.
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though qualified, the applicant was rejected by reason of his race
or sex; and (3) thereafter, the employer continued to seek appli-
cants with the discriminatee's qualifications."
The overwhelming majority of cases hold that white employees
may not maintain an action under Title VII based upon a claim of
reverse discrimination. "The persons protected under Title VII are
those minority group members who have traditionally been the tar-
gets of discrimination by labor unions . . . Surely it cannot be
said that Congress, by enacting Title VII, intended to protect those
white males who have traditionally dominated the labor unions."8'
The Fifth Circuit, usually the leader in the liberal interpretation of
civil rights statutes, found that the "dismissal of white employees
charged with misappropriating company property while not dis-
missing a similarly charged black employee [did] not raise a claim
upon which relief may be granted under Title VII," since there was
no allegation that the white employees were charged falsely and the
case did not involve disciplinary action for offenses not constituting
crimes .82
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION
The employment practices concerning sex which are prohibited
by Title VII parallel those relating to race. Thus section 703(a) of
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the
basis of sex with respect to virtually any condition of employment.
Fundamentally, Title VII eliminates employment practices based
on stereotyped roles for men and women. Discrimination against
women is often based upon nothing more than old, unchallenged
rules and customs.83 An employer cannot lawfully assert that a ma-
jority of women are unqualified or uninterested in a particular kind
of job, since such an assumption will exclude individual females
who are qualified and desire such a position. 4 Furthermore, to pro-
tect itself fully, the employer should not merely maintain a neutral
80. See also Taterka v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 966, 967 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
81. Mele v. United States Dep't of Justice, 10 F.E.P. Cases 1000, 1003 (D.N.J. 1975).
82. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 1165, 1166 (5th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam).
83. See Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 1973).
84. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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policy of hiring and promoting qualified women, but should take
''affirmative action" to ensure that more women apply for positions
and become qualified.85 Many examples of race discrimination can
also manifest themselves in sex-based discrimination. Employment
practices such as job qualifications or tests which are not job-
related, seniority, hiring by word-of-mouth and subjective evalua-
tion by supervisors are equally unlawful whether the alleged dis-
crimination is by race or sex. This section will, therefore, address
itself to special problems of sex discrimination.
A. BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ)
No job can ever be categorized as limited by race or color. How-
ever, with respect to sex (as well as religion or national origin), Title
VII provides that an employer may treat a particular job classifica-
tion as limited to one sex if sex is "a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particu-
lar business or enterprise .... "88 There are few positions for which
sex is genuinely a bona fide occupational qualification, and the
EEOC maintains that the exception should be interpreted as nar-
rowly as possible." The bona fide occupational qualification does
not permit a refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes.88
1. Advertisements and Job Applications
The Sex Discrimination Guidelines of the EEOC make it a viola-
tion of Title VII for a job advertisement to indicate a preference for
one sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for that
job. 9 The placement of an advertisement in a column headed
"Male" or "Female" is the most prominent example of this illegal
preference. While not directly addressing the issue of sex-based ad-
vertisements under Title VII, the Supreme Court has upheld the
authority of local fair employment agencies to prohibit newspapers
from placing advertisements in the male or female columns when
85. For a complete discussion on such self-initiated affirmative action programs see section
VII. infra.
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1974).
87. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1975).
88. The EEOC Guidelines cite as two examples of stereotyped characterizations the belief
that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship and that men are less facile at
assembling intricate equipment. Id. § 1604.2 (a)(1)(ii).
89. Id. § 1604.5.
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the jobs do not have bona fide occupational qualifications or excep-
tions."
Federal courts attach importance to a recent Third Circuit deci-
sion dealing with sexual stereotyping in a recruiting brochure.' The
educational requirements, experience and work were very similar for
two different positions, yet the jobs were segregated between males
and females with a higher rate paid to the former. In addition to
finding statistical evidence of almost complete segregation by sex,
the court found that the company's recruitment brochure encour-
aged such discrimination. The brochure described the female job as
"Fit for a Queen" and pictured only women performing the job,
while the position effectively reserved to men challenged the appli-
cant with the inquiry, "Are you the right man?"92 Such sexual spe-
cificity invited judicial disapproval.
2. Special Requirements and Customer Preferences
The BFOQ exception does not protect an employer who attempts
to exclude women from a job "not suited" for them based upon
sexual stereotypes. In the leading case, the Fifth Circuit ruled that
a job which routinely required the lifting of objects weighing over
30 pounds could not be restricted to men only,93 despite state laws
to the contrary. 4 If a job requires that certain poundage be lifted
regularly, an employer can require that applicants for employment
be tested to see if they can satisfy this requirement. However, the
test must be administered to both men and women. The fact that
only a small percentage of the women pass the test will not permit
the employer to conclude that sex is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication and, therefore, exclude all women. Instead, the employer
must offer positions to those women who pass the test or otherwise
qualify. 5 Of course, the employer is not required to hire females who
90. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
See also Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972). EEOC Guidelines provide
that "[a] pre-employment inquiry may ask 'Male-, Female-'; or 'Mr. Mrs. Miss,' provided
that the inquiry is made in good faith for a nondiscriminatory purpose." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7
(1975).
91. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2415
(1975).
92. Id. at 258.
93. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
94. For a discussion of protective state laws see section HI.G. infra.
95. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Ostapowicz v. John-
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cannot do the work nor offer unqualified applicants easier jobs.
The burden of proving the applicability of the BFOQ exception
rests upon the employer who seeks to assert it." In determining
whether an employer has met this burden, the courts and the EEOC
generally apply the standard set forth in Weeks v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co. 7 An employer has the burden of proving
reasonable cause to believe, i.e., a factual basis for believing, that
all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved. The physical requirements
of the job have not always been accepted as sufficient justification
for this belief. Where accepted, the employer bears the burden of
proving that women are not physically capable of performing the
job. In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,"5 the court noted that
individual capacity, rather than characteristics that might be corre-
lated with a particular sex, must be the basis for the application of
this exception."
Since an employment practice based on height or weight is neu-
tral on its face, i.e., not explicitly discriminatory against one sex, it
is not specifically prohibited by Title VII. However, if the neutral
policy is found to have a "markedly disproportionate impact" on
one sex, a prima facie case of sex discrimination can be estab-
lished. 10 Because minimum height and weight requirements dispro-
portionately affect women,"0' the employer must prove that such a
qualification is necessary to the performance of the job."2 The em-
ployer will have great difficulty showing such job-relatedness be-
cause even height and weight requirements for police have been
found to be discriminatory." 3
son Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Taylor v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,
6 F.E.P. Cases 50 (N.D. Ala. 1972); Sontag v. Bronstein, 33 N.Y.2d 197, 306 N.E.2d 405, 351
N.Y.S.2d 389 (1973).
96. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454 (D.N.J. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
97. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
98. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
99. Id. at 1224. The court cited as examples the job of wet nurse or dramatic parts where
there is a need for genuineness in portraying a character.
100. Cf. Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
101. See, e.g., Note, Height Standards in Police Employment and the Question of Sex
Discrimination: The Availability of Two Defenses for a Neutral Employment Policy Found
Discriminatory under Title VII, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 585, 588 n.13 (1974).
102. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975).
103. See Hardy v. Stumpf, 7 F.E.P. Cases 1091 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974). Employers' attempts
to justify discrimination against female employees because of other special requirements of
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A bona fide occupational qualification cannot be based upon pref-
erences of the employer, co-workers, clients, or customers. In Diaz
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., "4 the court found that limit-
ing the position of flight attendant to women, even in response to
customer preference, was unlawful. In interpreting section 703(e),
which requires that a "bona fide occupational qualification [be]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business," the court ruled that the word "necessary" requires the
application of a business necessity test, not a business convenience
test.' 5 Passenger preference for female flight attendants did not
meet this standard.
B. CHILD CARE AND MARRIAGE
An employment policy which forbids or restricts the employment
of married women, but is not applicable to married men, is discrimi-
natory. It is irrelevant that the rule is not directed against all fe-
males, but only against married females; such a practice is discrimi-
natory because it treats married females differently from married
males. ' The Supreme Court remanded Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp. 107 to determine whether there had been unlawful sex discrimi-
nation where an employer would not accept job applications from
women with pre-school-age children. Contrary to the circuit court
holding, it was no defense for the employer that 75 to 80 percent of
those hired were women, while only 70 to 75 percent of the appli-
cants were women.
An employer may not restrict employment to females who remain
unmarried without maintaining a similar restriction for male em-
ployees. In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. ,' the court held that
the job have been rejected: lifeguard who had to clean the locker rooms and pool area; child-
development supervisor of children from broken homes; flight-cabin attendant.
104. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
105. Id. at 388. The court stated:
[Dliscrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation
would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.
The primary function of an airline is to transport passengers safely from one point
to another . . . . No one has suggested that having male stewards will so seriously
affect the operation of an airline as to jeopardize or even minimize its ability to provide
safe transportation from one place to another. Id.
For a similar view of the business necessity test as applied in the area of race discrimination
see text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (1975).
107. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
108. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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a female plaintiff employed as a stewardess was discriminated
against on the basis of sex when she was discharged for violating the
airline's policy requiring stewardesses to be unmarried. The EEOC
has determined that an employer's rule forbidding or restricting the
employment of married women and not of married men is a dis-
crimination based upon sex.' °9 The EEOC has also held that an
employer's policy of refusing to hire unwed mothers discriminated
against females as a class in violation of Title VII."10 It is likewise
unlawful for a company to terminate the employment of the female
spouse when two employees marry, but the company may terminate
the employment of one of the two employees, leaving the decision
to them as to whose employment shall be terminated."' In cases
where the employee cannot decide, the employee with the greater
seniority is retained.
C. PREGNANCY
1. Mandatory Maternity Leave Rules
Any policy which requires all pregnant employees to take a leave
of absence at a specified time before the delivery date and which
limits return until a specified date following childbirth must be
reevaluated. The employer cannot impose upon all females a rule
which does not take into account the individual differences among
women. In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,"I the Supreme
Court sustained a fourteenth amendment due process challenge to
the mandatory maternity leaves of two government employers. The
employers required pregnant employees to leave their jobs without
pay five and four months before the expected birth date. The man-
datory leaves' were invalidated because of a hostility to "irrebut-
table presumptions" which did not reasonably recognize individual
differences and characteristics."13 Applying the same rationale to
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4 (a) (1975).
110. EEOC Decision No. 71-332, 1970 CCH EEOC Dec. 71-6164, at 4276.
111. EEOC Decision No. 70-453, 1970 CCH EEOC Dec. 71-6103, at 4153.
112. 414 U.S. 632, 648 (1974).
113. The Court did note that an individualized determination may not be required in those
"cases with maternity leave regulations requiring a termination of employment at some firm
date during the last few weeks of pregnancy." Id. at 647 n.13.
The courts are currently facing the question of whether mandatory maternity leave policies
of public employers violate the equal protection clause. See Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ.,
473 F.2d 629, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1973); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972). See also Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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private employers, the EEOC Guidelines state that mandatory
pregnancy leaves presumptively violate Title VII."1 After the em-
ployee has given birth and upon submission of a medical certificate
from her physician or from the employer's physician, the employer
must offer the mother re-employment When there is a vacancy. A
rule which did not permit re-employment of any employee until her
child had reached the age of three months was held invalid."' As
with maternity leave, a woman's fitness for re-employment must be
determined on an individual basis, in the light of her particular
medical condition, and not on the basis of an assumption or stereo-
type.
The pregnant employee is expected to give reasonable notice of
her pregnancy, i.e., notice sufficient to permit the employer to
maintain business continuity. In LaFleur, the Supreme Court indi-
cated approval of a policy which required the employee to give
assurances that care of the child would not unduly interfere with her
job duties, observing that "[w]hile such a requirement has within
it the potential for abuse, there is no evidence on this record that
the assurance required here is anything more than that routinely
sought by employers for prospective employees- that the worker is
willing to devote full attention to job duties.""'
2. Pregnancy as Any Other Illness
The EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines state, and several judi-
cial decisions confirm, that pregnancy is to be regarded as any other
illness or disability."7 The Guidelines require that disabilities due
to pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery from
114. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1975).
115. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
116. Id. at 650 n.16. Contrary to the prevailing authority, a state agency's employment
policy of requiring pregnant female employees to terminate their employment no later than
two months before expected delivery was declared valid under the fourteenth amendment.
Schattman v. Texas Empl. Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107
(1973). To the extent that the two month period cannot be statistically applicable to all
women or practically all women, this decision is impliedly overruled by LaFleur. In addition,
Title VII now covers public employees and the EEOC Guidelines state that both written and
unwritten policies which exclude employees because of pregnancy are prima facie violations.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1975).
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). See Gilbert v. General Elec., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (Nos. 74-1589, -1590). Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1989 (1975) (No.
74-1245); Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 435 (2d Cir.
1974).
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these conditions be treated as temporary disabilities under any
health or temporary disability insurance plan."18 Similarly, a female
may utilize accumulated sick leave for pregnancy-related
disabilities. The Guidelines prohibit employment policies which
deny employment to an applicant who is pregnant or which auto-
matically require the discharge of a pregnant employee.' Addition-
ally, an employer may not discharge an employee who is temporar-
ily disabled because insufficient leave is available if this employ-
ment policy disproportionately affects one sex and cannot be justi-
fied by business necessity. While this provision was written to en-
compass both male and female disabilities, it is primarily directed
at employment policies which do not permit leave for pregnancy and
childbirth.' 0
The Third Circuit has ruled that a private employer's "income
protection plan" which provided employees with the payment of
income during periods of disability was discriminatory because the
plan did not pay any benefits for disability due to or related to
pregnancy."' The court rejected the argument that pregnancy was
in some way distinguishable from other illnesses or disabilities
because it involved some element of voluntariness. The court ob-
served that the company's plan covered disabilities resulting from
many voluntary and potentially harmful activities such as drinking,
smoking and skiing which left pregnancy as the only "voluntary"
disability not covered. Furthermore, the court was unwilling to
accept completely the argument that pregnancy was voluntary. It
observed that no method of contraception was foolproof and that
religious convictions also played a role in determining the voluntary
nature of a pregnancy. The court afforded considerable deference to
the EEOC Guidelines,12 and was not convinced by company argu-
ments that coverage of pregnancy would greatly increase the costs
of the plan to the employer.
The decision was found to be distinguishable from an earlier Su-
preme Court ruling which upheld California's exclusion of normal
118. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975).
119. Id. § 1604.10(a).
120. Id. § 1604.10(c).
121. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1989
(1975) (No. 74-1245).
122. See also note 23 supra.
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pregnancy from disability coverage for employees of the state.'1 In
that case, the Court reasoned that California had a valid reason for
excluding pregnancy, namely, the cost of broadening the coverage.
Yet since this case was initiated before Title VII was extended to
cover public employees, the case was decided solely on constitu-
tional grounds. Subsequently, the Second, Third and Fourth Cir-
cuits have refused to be bound by the decision.'24
D. PAY AND PROMOTIONS
1. Equal Pay for Substantially Equivalent Work
The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work," more accurately
stated as equal pay for substantially equivalent skill, effort and
responsibility, traces its statutory origins to the Equal Pay Act of
1963.125 The Act prohibits compensating employees of one sex at a
lesser wage rate than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for
equivalent work. "Equivalent work" does not mean identical work,
but refers to jobs which require equivalent skill, effort, and responsi-
bility and which are performed under similar working conditions. 26
An employer may not reduce the wage of any individual in order to
achieve wage equality.'27 However, if the employer compensates its
employees under a merit system or on a commission basis, and by
chance the average earnings of one sex exceed that of the other, the
employer is acting lawfully, so long as the method of computation
is equally and fairly applied to both sexes.12
Employers are held to a high standard under the Equal Pay Act.
In Coming Glass Works v. Brennan,12 9 the Supreme Court ruled that
a company violated the Equal Pay Act by paying a higher base wage
to male night shift inspectors than to female inspectors performing
the same tasks on the day shift, where the higher wage was in
123. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
124. See cases cited note 117 supra.
125. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d) (1965). The Equal Pay Act is an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (the Wage-Hour Law). In 1972, Congress broadened Equal Pay coverage to
such individuals as professional, administrative and executive employees, and outside sales-
men who were ordinarily excluded from coverage under the Wage-Hour Law. Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
126. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970). See also Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
127. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d)(1) (1965).
128. Id.
129. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
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addition to a separate night differential paid to all employees for
night work.'30 Permitting women to bid for jobs on the night shift
as vacancies occurred did not remedy the situation. The only per-
missible solution was to equalize "the base wages of female day
inspectors with the higher rates paid the night inspectors." 3 ' To
justify pay differentials within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act,
management must require that the job in each case demand a
unique package and ask whether it has artifically created two job
titles, one male and one female, compensated at different rates,
when in fact the skill, effort, and responsibilities are equivalent for
the two jobs. If they are equivalent, the compensation must be
equal.
2. Promotions and Seniority
The EEOC maintains the position that it is an unlawful employ-
ment practice to maintain separate lines of progression based upon
sex where this would adversely affect any employee, unless sex is a
bona fide occupational qualification for that job.'12 In LeBlanc v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,'33 a federal district court
held than an employer discriminated against certain female em-
ployees on the basis of sex when, without considering their qualifica-
tions, it declined to consider their bids for the job of test deskman.
The court was not inclined to accept any justification for such con-
duct.
"Bumping" of women is discriminatory if male employees with
less seniority in jobs which could be adequately performed by
women cannot also be bumped by women.'34 In one case, an em-
130. The Court, in ruling that the company had violated the Equal Pay Act, observed:
The differential arose simply because men would not work at the low rates paid women
inspectors, and it reflected a job market in which [the company] could pay women
less than men for the same work. That the company took advantage of such a situation
may be understandable as a matter of economics, but its differential nevertheless
became illegal once Congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal
work. Id. at 205.
131. Id. at 206. The importance of this case was accentuated by the Court's explanation
of the purpose of distinguishing jobs by skill, effort and responsibility. According to the Court,
the congressional intent in using these terms was to adopt the well-defined and well-accepted
principles of job evaluation so as to ensure that wage differentials based upon bona fide job
evaluation plans would be valid under the Equal Pay Act.
132. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a) (1975).
133. 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
990 (1972).
134. Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970) (dictum).
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ployer was found to have violated Title VII when it filled a vacancy
with a male employee having less seniority than the plaintiff female
employee; 3 ' in Donner v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,'36 a femal& plant
clerk was held to have been discriminated against because of her sex
when she was discharged in a plant economy move because she
possessed no seniority or bidding rights, in an environment where
no female in the plant possessed such rights.
E. FRINGE BENEFITS
The EEOC Guidelines define fringe benefits as including "medi-
cal, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits;
profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave, and other terms, conditions
and privileges of employment."'37 The Guidelines provide that an
employer cannot defend a different level of benefits for one sex on
the ground that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to
one sex than the other.3 ' This position has been repeatedly sup-
ported by the federal courts. 39 An employer may not condition bene-
fits available to employees and their spouses and families on
whether the employee is "head of a household" or "principal wage
earner" in the family.4 " Such a policy tends to make benefits avail-
able only to male employees and their families.
The EEOC Guidelines clearly prohibit different retirement ages
for men and women.' However, because this issue has received only
a limited amount of attention from the courts and inasmuch as
many employers are locked into such retirement plans, the law must
be considered uncertain at this point. Nonetheless, the trend is
definitely toward the abolition of all such retirement distinctions
and employers are advised that if a revised retirement plan can be
135. Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d
240 (3d Cir. 1973).
136. 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971).
137. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a) (1975).
138. Id. § 1604.9(e).
139. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.
Ct. 2415 (1975) (No. 74-1245); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974),
aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (Nos.
74-1589, -1590).
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(c) (1975). Likewise, an employer may not offer benefits: (a) to the
wives and families of male employees where the same benefits are not made available to the
husbands and families of female employees; (b) to the wives of male employees which are
not made available to female employees; or (c) to husbands of female employees which are
not made available to male employees. Id. § 1604.9(d).
141. Id. § 1604.9(f).
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instituted with minimal cost or dislocation, they should proceed to
do so."' In Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 43 the court observed
that a plan which mandated that women retire three years earlier
than men was tantamount to a discharge. It was no defense that
such a retirement plan was part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the employer and the union.' Likewise, an employer
may not differentiate in retirement benefits on account of sex. " 5
Pension plans present a unique problem because they are linked
to actuarial computations which assume that women outlive men.
Thus a company plan that makes equal contributions to a pension
plan for men and women may nonetheless result in a lower monthly
benefit for women, who, under actuarial assumptions, could be re-
ceiving monthly benefits for a longer period of time than men. No
court has faced this issue, hence the law on this point is in the early
stages of evolution. However, management should be aware of the
distinct possibility that in the future, the law may mandate the use
of premium or rate tables which do not differentiate on the basis of
sex, thus requiring both equal contributions and equal periodic ben-
efits.' 46
F. GROOMING AND DRESS REQUIREMENTS
The question of differential grooming standards has primarily
been raised by long-haired male employees and the judicial answers
have been diverse. The most persuasive position is that taken by the
District of Columbia Circuit, which held that a standard of groom-
ing and dress which requires conformity with the public estimation
of "neat and well-groomed" is essential to the operation of many
businesses. "7 It is not unreasonable for an employer to expect differ-
142. EEOC decisions have found, as violative of Title VII, plans which assume that mar-
ried males are the "heads of the household," those under which the availability of coverage
differs between the sexes and those under which different options exist for each sex.
143. 444 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). See also Rosen v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454 (D.N.J. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 477
F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
144. In a recent case not involving Title VII, the Supreme Court struck down a provision
of the social security law which granted different benefits for widowers than for widows.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
145. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) (1975).
146. See Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension
Programs, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1974).
147. Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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ences between men and women in satisfying the one standard of
proper grooming. In this case, the employer's grooming code forbid-
ding long hair on male employees whose duties included visiting
offices of the employer's customers did not violate Title VII since
the image of the employer is created by its employees in dealing
with the public on company assignments. The Fifth Circuit has held
that a grooming code requiring different hair lengths for male and
female job applicants discriminated on the basis of grooming stan-
dards, and not on the basis of sex within the meaning of section
703.145 Such a code was, therefore, beyond the proscription of Title
VII. The court felt that the employer's administration of the code
was more related to its business standards than to any inequality
of employment opportunity.
G. PROTECTIVE STATE LAWS
Many states have enacted laws which limit the employment of
women in certain occupations, e.g., in jobs requiring the lifting of
weights in excess of a given amount, working at certain times of
night, or for a total number of hours per week."' The EEOC, which
considers that such "protective legislation" does not take into ac-
count the capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual
females, holds that such laws which conflict with Title VII are su-
perseded by that law and will not be considered either a defense to
an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or a basis
for the application of the "bona fide occupational qualification"
exception.'50
The courts have upheld the EEOC's position that Title VII su-
persedes state protective laws. A California district court declared
two such "protective" provisions of the California Labor Code, re-
148. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
149. See, e.g., Rule 59 of the Georgia Commission of Labor promulgated pursuant to GA.
CODE ANN. § 54-122(d) (1973).
150. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1975). See Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089
(S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972). A number of states
require that minimum wage and premium pay for overtime be provided for female employees.
An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful practice if: (i) it refuses to hire
or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of female applicants or employ-
ees in order to avoid the payment of minimum wages or overtime pay required by state law;
or (ii) it does not provide the same benefits for male employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(3).
As to other kinds of sex-oriented state employment laws, such as those requiring special
rest and meal periods or physical facilities for women, provision of these benefits to one sex
only will be a violation of Title VII. Id. § 1604.2(b)(4).
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quiring certain overtime premium pay to be paid only to women, to
be "in conflict with and superseded by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."'' Employers may not rely on state laws purporting to
limit the number of hours or time of day that a female employee
may work, because such laws must also yield to the conflicting
provisions of Title VII.'52
IV. AGE DISCRIMINATION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196753 prohibits
employment discrimination against individuals between the ages of
forty and sixty-four inclusive,'54 and is the major federal legislation
prohibiting age discrimination. The Act makes it unlawful for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to dis-
criminate as to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment'5 if the employee is within the prescribed age limits.
It applies to individuals at every level of employment; protection is
not denied because the individual is in (or has applied for) a super-
visory, management or executive position. Labor unions' 6 and em-
ployment agencies'57 are also subject to the Act. The Wage-Hour
Administrator, who is charged with enforcement of the Act,' 8 takes
the position that requests in pre-employment inquiries or on a job
application such as "date of birth" or "state age" are permissible
provided the information obtained is not used in a discriminatory
manner.'59 Approximately two-thirds of the states have laws prohib-
151. Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (N.D. Cal.
1973), afl'd, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974).
152. See Sontag v. Bronstein, 5 F.E.P. Cases 21 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1972). In Garneau
v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971), the Massachusetts Commissioner of Labor
and Industries was enjoined from taking any steps to enforce a state law which limited the
number of hours which females could work, because the state law conflicted with Title VII.
The court ruled that female employees of the defendant corporation were entitled to the same
overtime opportunities as men.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970).
154. Id. § 631. In addition to the age requirements, to be covered by the Act an individual
must be employed by "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." Id. § 630(b).
155. Id. § 623 (a)(1).
156. Id. § 623 (c).
157. Id. § 623 (b).
158. For a complete discussion of enforcement of the Act see section IV. C. infra.
159. 29 C.F.R. § 860.92(d) (1975). The Administrator advises that the employer should
protect itself by including on the application form the following statutory reference: "The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits discrimination on the basis of age with
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iting age discrimination but there is little uniformity.'6 ° Some stat-
utes follow the Federal Act'"' while others either narrow'62 or ex-
pand' the protected age groups. Ten states do not define which age
groups are to be protected, but include age with other forms of
discrimination. 64
A. PROTECTED AGES
Prohibiting age discrimination between certain ages creates prob-
lems regarding discrimination among individuals within the pre-
scribed age group, and protection of persons outside the group. For
example, an employer may not limit hirings and promotions to indi-
viduals under 35 years of age because the limitation creates a prefer-
ence which excludes protected as well as unprotected age groups.165
It would also be unlawful to promote only employees of certain ages
within the protected group since this discriminates against other
individuals in the protected group.'66 Similarly, an employer may
respect to individuals who are at least 40 but less than 65 years of age." Id. § 860.95(a).
160. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1407 (1970). Virginia does not have an age discrimination in
employment law.
161. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2318 (1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1003 (1974). In many cases
the state statutes do not precisely define the limits of a particular protected age bracket. For
example, does "between 40 and 65" mean 64 inclusive, or 65 inclusive? See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 710 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1102 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (Supp.
1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § '1101.17 (Anderson 1973);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.024(1) (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.090 (1962); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.32 (5)(b)(1) (1974).
162. See IDAHO CODE § 44-1602 (Supp. 1975) ("60 years of age or older"); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 881 (Supp. 1975) ("over 45 years of age"); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:893 (1964) ("under
fifty years"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24A (1965) ("between the ages of forty-five and
sixty-five"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(h) (1964) ("between the ages of forty and sixty-two
inclusive"); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-1 (1969) ("attained the age of 45 and not attained
the age of sixty-five").
163. See CoLo. REy. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-116 (1974) ("between the ages of eighteen and sixty
years"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31.122(K) (1972) ("between forty and sixty-five,
inclusive"); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.303(a) (Supp. 1975) ("between the ages of 18 and
60"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(q) (Supp. 1975) ("ages forty through sixty-five, both inclu-
sive").
164. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1962) ("reasonable demands of the position"); HAWAII
REV. STAT. tit. 21, § 378-2(1) (Supp. 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6 (1)(a) (1975); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (1)(A) (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49 B, § 19 (a) (Supp. 1975);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-306(a) (Supp. 1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:1 (Supp.
1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (A) (1974); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW. § 296.1 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
165. 29 C.F.R. § 860.36(c) (1975).
166. Id. § 860.91(a); see Opinion signed by Wage-Hour Administrator Clarence T. Lundqu-
ist, August 7, 1968.
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not discriminate between two individuals both of whom are within
the protected age group. ' Instead, the employer must reach a deci-
sion by considering the capabilities and experience of the two indi-
viduals. Age discrimination between two individuals under pro-
tected age limits is not prohibited. 6 " Nonetheless, the employer
should wherever possible avoid indicating a preference for any age,
whatever the age group. Although the federal act does not protect
employees outside of a certain range, many state laws do.'6'
Open to challenge is the adoption of 64 as the upper age limit
under the Age Discrimination Act. The congressional hearings on
the Act'0 are silent on the subject and gerontological research indi-
cates that there is no valid reason to distinguish the class of workers
over 65 from those under 65 either on the basis of work ability or
contribution to the employer.'7 1 Older workers are less likely to be
involved in work accidents, and although older workers are more
susceptible to illness and tend to be disabled longer when injured
than younger workers, older workers on the whole are absent from
work fewer days.' 2
B. VALID BASES OF AGE DISCRIMINATION
Efforts by employers to evade the provisions of the Age Discrimi-
167. 29 C.F.R. § 860.91(b) (1975).
168. Id.
169. See notes 163-64 supra and accompanying text.
170. 113 Cong. Rec. 31248, 34738, 35053, 35228 (1967).
171. See, e.g., Confrey & Goldstein, The Health Status of Aging People, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY 165 (C. Tibbitts ed. 1960).
172. Id. at 80. A leading article on the subject offers the following as a list of invalid reasons
advanced by an employer for not hiring older employees:
1. Older workers are often afflicted with physical and mental infirmities.
2. Young people must be hired who can be trained, motivated and promoted.
3. Young people are willing to work for less money than older people.
4. Pension, health and life insurance costs increase as the worker ages.
5. Many older workers lack skill, experience or education.
6. According to mortality tables, the older worker will work less time for the firm than
a younger worker.
7. Older workers are more costly to train and are less productive.
8. Older workers are less adaptable and more difficult to train than younger workers.
9. Balance in age is needed in every work force. Because seniority clauses in collective
bargaining agreements determine retention and promotion, employers need to hire
young persons whenever possible.
10. Young executives feel uncomfortable directing older employees.
Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economics, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimination
Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. 839, 845 (1974).
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nation Act are varied, but for the most part unsuccessful unless
based upon recognized exceptions to the Act. Those exceptions in-
clude: (1) a bona fide occupational qualification; 173 (2) an employ-
ment practice based upon reasonable factors other than age; 74 or (3)
an employment practice dictated by the terms of a bona fide senior-
ity system or employee benefit plan. 175
1. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)
The Wage-Hour Administrator construes narrowly the situations
in which an employer can claim age to be a bona fide occupational
qualification; as always, the burden of proving the exception is on
the employer. 76 The safety and convenience of the public has been
used by at least two federal courts to permit maximum cut-off ages
for bus drivers. 7  The exception appears applicable whenever there
can be shown a relationship between work assignments and the
degenerative physical and sensory changes of the aging process
which begins late in a person's life. 117 Unless the employer can pro-
duce some persuasive statistics showing this relationship, it is risk-
ing violation of the Age Discrimination Act if it has a mandatory
cutoff age for hiring or promotion. Without a tie to the public safety,
the same strict business necessity test, applicable to other forms of
discrimination, is applicable under the Act.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
174. Id.
175. Id. § 623(f)(2).
176. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1975).
177. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1122 (1975); Hodgson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 4 F.E.P. Cases 728 (S.D. Fla. 1972). In
Tamiami Trail Tours, the court ruled that a bus company could refuse to hire drivers over
40 years of age, because age was a bona fide occupational qualification in view of the need
for public safety. The court said, "The touchstone for the BFOQ exemption ... is a finding
that age is a reasonable requirement, necessitated by normal business operations and having
a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at 730. In Greyhound Lines, a
bus company which had a policy of refusing to hire persons 35 years of age or older was
required to prove a rational basis for believing that elimination of its maximum hiring age
would increase the likelihood of risk of harm to its passengers. Since the company could show
that elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of one more person than might
otherwise occur under the present hiring practice, the court validated the requirement.
178. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1122 (1975). In Greyhound Lines, the statistical evidence introduced by the company re-
flected, inter alia, that the company's safest driver was an individual with 16-20 years of
driving experience and between 50 and 55 years of age. This optimum blend of age and
experience could never be attained in hiring an applicant who was over 40 years of age.
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2. Reasonable Factors Other Than Age
An employer may use a reasonable factor other than age in its
hiring and promotion practices. For example, an employer may set
physical fitness requirements based on medical examinations re-
lated to standards reasonably necessary for the specific job, so long
as the tests are uniformly applied to all employees and/or applicants
regardless of age.' The employer may also evaluate its employees
on the basis of educational level or quantity and quality of produc-
tion,8 0 and may use employee tests if all factors have a valid rela-
tionship to job requirements and are uniformly applied in good faith
to employees of all ages.' 8' Unlike other areas of employment dis-
crimination law, such as race or sex, an employer may use a reasona-
ble factor other than age in its employment decisions even though
its use has a disproportionately adverse impact on persons within
the protected age group. For example, in Stringfellow v. Monsanto
Co., 12 the use of eighteen various criteria to make termination deci-
sions was upheld even though only three of the 47 terminated em-
ployees were under 40 years of age.'
3. Bona Fide Seniority and Employee Benefit Plans
A bona fide seniority system must be based upon length of service
as the primary criterion for the allocation of available employment
opportunities and privileges among younger and older workers.
Bona fide seniority systems may be qualified by such factors as
merit, capacity, or ability.8 4 Since seniority systems ordinarily af-
ford greater rights to those employees with longer service, if a pur-
ported seniority system gives lesser rights to those with longer serv-
ice or treats less favorably those protected by the Age Discrimina-
tion Act, it may be held invalid as an attempt to avoid the purposes
of the Act.8 5 Furthermore, a seniority system that segregates, classi-
fies or otherwise discriminates on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, will obviously not be regarded as bona fide.1
8 1
179. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(1)(i) (1975).
180. Id. § 860.103(f)(2).
181. Id. § 860.104(b).
182. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
183. Id. at 1180. Accord, Billingsley v. Service Technology Corp., 6 F.E.P. Cases 404 (S.D.
Tex. 1973).
184. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(a) (1975).
185. Id. § 860.105(b).
186. Id. § 860.105(d).
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An employer is not required to provide older workers with the
same pension, retirement or insurance benefits as he provides to
younger workers, so long as any differential between groups or work-
ers is in accordance with the terms of a bona fide benefit plan. A
retirement, pension or insurance plan complies with the Act if the
employer expends the same amount of money for an older worker
as for a younger one, even if this results in lesser benefits or insur-
ance coverage for the older worker. Benefits may also validly vary
within the protected age group if the benefits are based on a formula
involving age and length of service. 8 '
Early retirement, even involuntary retirement, is valid provided
again that it is within the terms of a bona fide plan. ' But an
employer may not utilize a retirement plan to retire prematurely
employees who are not participants in the plan.8 9 In one case, the
employee plan, which was entirely funded from a percentage of
company profits, required that all employees retire at age 60.190 One
employee was forced to retire and suit was brought by the Secretary
of Labor in his behalf seeking reinstatement and appropriate back
pay. The Secretary charged that the company did not have a bona
fide plan qualifying for an exemption from the Age Discrimination
Act because the Internal Revenue Service defined retirement plans
as those in which employer contributions are based upon the antici-
pated costs of the employee's retirement, and excluded plans in
which contributions are based solely upon profits. The Fifth Circuit,
however, rejected this argument, observing that retirement under
the Age Discrimination Act and the Internal Revenue Code have
different purposes; the company's plan satisfied the bona fide test
of the Age Discrimination Act by being genuine and authentic in
that the plan existed and the employee was actually paid benefits
under it.
C. ENFORCEMENT AND RECORDKEEPING
Unlike Title VII, which is administered by the EEOC, the Age
Discrimination Act is administered and enforced by the Wage-Hour
Administration of the Department of Labor. Few cases have been
187. Id. § 860.120(a).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(2) (1970).
189. Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971).
190. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
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brought under the Age Discrimination Act, in part because of the
limited number of compliance officers available for enforcement in
the Wage-Hour Administration. The Secretary of Labor, through
the Wage-Hour Administrator, is empowered to make investiga-
tions, issue rules and regulations for administration of the law,",
and enforce its provisions by legal proceedings when voluntary com-
pliance cannot be obtained.1 2 The Secretary or any aggrieved per-
son'9 3 may bring suit under the Act, and a class action may be
brought on behalf of similarly situated employees as provided by
section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.' Suit to enforce the
Act must be brought within two years after the violation,"' or in the
case of a willful9 6 violation, within three years.
Before initiating court action, the Secretary of Labor must at-
tempt to secure voluntary compliance by informal conciliation, con-
ference, and persuasion.'91 Before an individual institutes court ac-
tion, he must give the Secretary not less than 60 days notice of his
intention to sue.'98 Where a state has its own age discrimination
statute, no suit may be initiated under the Federal Act until 60 days
after the commencement of proceedings in the appropriate state
administrative body, unless the state proceedings were terminated
in less than 60 days. 9 Failure to utilize available state administra-
tive proceedings may result in the dismissal of a federal action. The
courts, in enforcement actions, are authorized to grant any relief
appropriate to carrying out the Act's purposes, including back pay
or an order compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion.2 11
Under regulations promulgated under the Act, an employer must
keep records indicating name, address, date of birth, occupation,
rate of pay and weekly compensation for three years.0 ' Other speci-
fied records need only be kept for one year.22 The employer must
191. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
192. Id. § 626(b).
193. Id. § 626(c).
194. See LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1970).
196. "Willful" means intentional; it does not require malice. See, e.g., Coleman v. Jiffy
June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
198. Id. § 626(c).
199. Id. § 626(d).
200. Id. § 626(b).
201. 29 C.F.R. § 850.3(a) (1975).
202. These include any records made in the ordinary course of business in connection with
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:209
keep on file employee benefit plans (such as pension and insurance
plans) as well as copies of any written seniority and merit systems
for the full period during which the plan or system is in effect plus
one year.213 All records must be made available for inspection and
transcription by representatives of the Wage-Hour Administration
during business hours. In an enforcement action by the Wage-Hour
Administrator, the employer may be required to retain records until
the action is completed. An employer, for good cause, may petition
the Wage-Hour Administrator for permission to maintain records in
a manner other than as required." 4
V. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Although given a liberal interpretation by the EEOC, Title VII
does not actually define the term "religion.""2 5 Besides the tradi-
tional religions, the EEOC recognizes as "religious" those observ-
ances characterized by sincere and meaningful beliefs occupying
places in their possessors' lives equivalent to those filled by the
traditional God. Not every ideology constitutes a "religion" under
Title VII, 26 but the protections against discriminatory practices
because of religion have been extended to the nonreligious. An
employee who was an atheist was held to have been constructively
the following:
(1) Job applications, resumes or any other form of employment inquiry, including
those pertaining to the failure or refusal to hire any individual.
(2) Promotion, demotion, transfer, selection for training, layoff, recall or discharge.
(3) Job orders submitted to a labor organization or an employment agency.
(4) Test papers completed by applicants and other employment tests considered by
the employer.
(5) Results of any physical examination where the examination is used in connection
with any personnel action.
(6) Advertisements or notices to the public relating to job openings, promotions,
training programs, or opportunities for overtime work. Id. § 850.3(b)(1).
Two exceptions exist to the one year requirement. Application forms and other pre-
employment records for positions which are, and are known by applicants to be temporary
need be kept only 90 days from the date of the personnel action to which they relate. Id. §
850.3(b)(3).
203. Id. § 850.3(b)(2).
204. Id. § 850.11(a).
205. Section 701(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j) (1974), states:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommo-
date to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice with-
out undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
206. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973) (Ku Klux Klan
not a religion within the meaning of Title VII).
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(hence illegally) discharged when she terminated her job upon being
told by her supervisor that she had to attend staff meetings which
were begun with a devotional service.2"'
A. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
Section 701(j) of Title VII requires an employer to make "reason-
able accommodations" to the religious needs of its employees.2"'
Clearly under this provision an employer could no more lawfully
limit a job classification to Protestants than it could to whites.
EEOC decisions have held that intentional discrimination by an
employer against an employee or prospective employee solely be-
cause of his religion is per se violative of Title VII. When the issue
is one of resultant discrimination, i.e., discrimination resulting from
a conflict between a particular tenet of an employee's or prospective
employee's religion and a work rule established by an employer, the
courts apply the tests described below.2 9 One aspect of religious
discrimination stands out significantly. Specifically, what should
the employer's policy be with respect to employees or applicants
who observe Saturday or some other day as the Sabbath or who
observe special religious holidays during the year?
207. Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
208. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j) (1974). The Title VII requirement of reasonable accommoda-
tion does not violate the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. Cummins v. Parker
Seal Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 974 (6th Cir. 1975). In Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F.
Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974), the court said:
The incidental effect of the regulation perhaps indirectly aids religion but its primary
effect is to guarantee job security. The purpose and effect of the law as interpreted by
the regulation is not primarily to aid religion but to prevent employers from devising
means to discriminate which are not facially discriminatory but which do discriminate
in effect and intent.
Finally, the regulation does not involve excessive government entanglement with
religion. The regulation simply requires the employer to make affirmative efforts to
accommodate the employee's religion. No further involvement is necessary than a
judgment by the E.E.O.C. or the court that no such accommodation was made. That
is not the kind of entanglement contemplated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
We find and conclude, therefore, that the interpretation of Title VII's prohibition of
discrimination by reason of religion, as embodied in the E.E.O.C. regulation, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.1(b) does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. 375 F. Supp. at 888.
However, a state governmental practice of closing offices for three hours on Good Friday and
paying employees for that time was held to be violative of both the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the first amendment. Mandel v. Hodges, 10 F.E.P. Cases 480 (Cal. Ct.
of App. 1975).
209. See, e.g., Dawson v. Mizell, 3 F.E.P. Cases 313, 315 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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The EEOC Guidelines provide that the duty to avoid religious
discrimination "includes an obligation on the part of the employer
to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of em-
ployees and prospective employees where such accommodations can
be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business."2 ' In Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.,'" the Sixth Circuit
sustained the complaint of an applicant who had been denied em-
ployment because, as a Seventh Day Adventist, he was unwilling to
work on Saturday. The court, quoting the EEOC Guidelines on
religious discrimination, remanded the case to the lower court to
determine whether the employer "could 'reasonably accommodate'
plaintiff's religious practice 'without undue hardship.' "" When the
case returned to the district court, that court ruled in favor of the
applicant, finding that his employment would not work an "undue
hardship" on the employer, despite proof of scheduling problems,
an adverse effect on the morale of other employees, and the possible
economic burden caused by additional overtime.2 13 The court was
particularly persuaded by the absence of any prior attempt by the
employer to reasonably accommodate the applicant. 24 Similarly,
the Fifth Circuit 25 held an employer to the same standard-
reasonable accommodation without undue hardship. While no clear
definition of reasonable accommodation was offered, the court im-
plied that efforts to transfer to another shift or arrangement for a
substitute would have been sufficient. The validity of this ration-
ale has been called into question by the Sixth Circuit in a sub-
sequent review of Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.216 The circuit
court, in reversing the ruling of the district court, challenged both
the statutory and legislative justification for the EEOC guideline.
Courts have adopted a case-by-case factual analysis in order to
determine whether the "reasonable accommodation" rule has been
complied with. An employer must allow some latitude in the em-
ployee's work schedule so as to free him for religious observances
which his denomination obliges him to honor2 l' and must first show
210. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1975).
211. 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972).
212. Id. at 351.
213. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
214. Id. at 689.
215. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1972).
216. 11 F.E.P. Cases 129 (6th Cir. 1975) (2-1 decision).
217. Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala.
1974).
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an attempt at accommodation before claiming undue hardship.-" 8
On the other hand, an employee seeking special treatment because
of his religious beliefs under an employer's work rules must be pre-
pared to make a prima facie showing of the sincerity of his convic-
tions, if their sincerity is challenged."9
B. UNDUE HARDSHIP
The "undue hardship" exception to the "reasonable accommoda-
tion" rule has been interpreted by the courts as requiring more than
mere inconvenience or even "considerable" inconvenience. 20 In
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.,2 21 the necessity of either requiring
other employees to work overtime at time and one-half pay or hiring
an extra copyreader was found not to be an undue hardship. In
Hardison v. Trans World Airlines,22 however, the court ruled that
to change work schedules for an employee because of his religious
observances when the employee's duties could not be performed
by another worker on his shift and a change of shifts would have
violated the union's seniority system, was an undue hardship. The
court noted that Title VII did not require an employer to impose
hardships on the remainder of the employees merely to accommo-
date the religious beliefs of a few.
Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination, like prohibi-
tions of other forms of discrimination, requires more from the em-
ployer than uniform application of work rules to all employees. Cer-
tain work rules and practices which are facially fair but which, if
uniformly enforced, have a discriminatory effect on the religious
beliefs of certain employees must be justified by the business ne-
cessity test.22 Employers can be held guilty of religious discrimina-
tion when they insist upon conformity to certain standards of dress
or appearance without having established that such codes are neces-
sary to the proper conduct of their business.
Flexibility appears to be the controlling factor used to determine
218. Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
219. See Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 5 E.P.D. 8543, at 7560 (E.D. Tex.
1973).
220. Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
221. 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (dictum), reu'd, 11 F.E.P. Cases 129 (6th Cir.
1975) (2-1 decision). See also United States v. City of Albuquerque, 10 F.E.P. Cases 771
(D.N.M. 1975).
222. 375 F. Supp. 877, 889 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
223. See, e.g., Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Reid v. Menphis
Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (dictum), rev'd, 11 F.E.P. Cases 129 (6th
Cir. 1975) (2-1 decision).
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"business necessity." In Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tele-
phone Co. ,224 the court said that as the degree of business hardship
increases, the quantity of conduct which will satisfy the reasonable
accommodation requirement decreases. The balancing of these two
concepts constitutes the "business necessity" which will validate an
employment practice even though it burdens some employees be-
cause of their religious beliefs. But mere speculation that employee
discontent will result from making exceptions to uniformly enforced
rules does not constitute sufficient justification for failing to make
reasonable accommodations. Proof of significant and serious em-
ployee discontent is necessary. 25
VI. OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
A. NATIONAL ORIGIN
Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of national
origin.22 1 While not infrequently linked to racial discrimination, it
is a rarer specimen and the cases are sparse. When it does occur, it
is generally commingled with racial discrimination and the interdic-
tions against the latter apply equally. Race and color are treated
synonymously by the courts21 and the EEOC. Title VII, on its face,
distinguishes national origin from race and color, stating that na-
tional origin, like sex and religion (but unlike race or color), can be
a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 221 Since the passage
of Title VII in 1964, the bona fide occupational qualification has
224. 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
225. See Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684, 689 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), rev'd,
11 F.E.P. Cases 129 (6th Cir. 1975) (2-1 decision). The courts are divided on the question of
whether reasonable accommodation requires an employer or union to make exceptions to
uniformly enforced work rules contained in a collective bargaining agreement. The courts do
agree, however, that uniform requirements to pay union dues under penalty of dismissal are
enforceable even when the refusal to pay stems from religious beliefs. See, e.g., Hammond v.
United Papermakers Union, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972);
Cooper v. General Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
226. According to the Supreme Court the only direct definition given the term "national
origin" is a remark made on the floor of the House of Representatives in 1964 by Congressman
Roosevelt: "It means the country from which you or your forebearers [sic] came . . . . You
may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country." Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89 (1973), quoting 110 CONG. REc. 2549 (1964).
227. Thus the Second Circuit, in upholding numerical goals for nonwhites, observed: "The
term 'nonwhite' as so used is defined to mean black and Spanish-surnamed workers." Rios
v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1974).
228. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e - 2(e)(1) (1974).
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been narrowly interpreted; there are no reported cases upholding a
BFOQ on national origin.
National origin discrimination must be distinguished from dis-
crimination on the basis of citizenship. The former refers to the
country of origin and involves citizens of the United States. In
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,2" the Supreme Court was
faced with circumstances which quite clearly elucidated the distinc-
tion. The employer, located in San Antonio, Texas, maintained a
policy of hiring only American citizens. This policy resulted in a
denial of employment to the plaintiff, a lawfully admitted resident
alien and a citizen of Mexico. The Supreme Court upheld the
citizens-only limitation relying on the good faith of the employer as
evidenced by an undisputed practice of hiring employees of Mexi-
can origin, provided they became American citizens. However, the
Fifth Circuit has apparently extended the substantive equivalent of
Title VII to aliens by providing a procedural alternative: aliens can
sue under section 1981 which grants to all persons within the United
States the same right to make a contract, including an employment
contract. 0 Absolute prohibitions against the employment of aliens
have been found suspect and violative of equal protection guaran-
tees in two recent Supreme Court decisions. In Sugarman v. Dou-
gall,21 the Court invalidated a New York statute which prohibited
the employment of aliens in the competitive class of the state civil
service. Likewise, in In re Griffiths,12 a Connecticut court rule which
denied qualified resident aliens admission to the bar was
invalidated. These decisions are applicable only to governmental or
"state action" employers and have not as yet been extended to Title
VII coverage.
The EEOC Guidelines make discriminatory the use of tests in the
English language where English is not the first language of the
individual tested and where mastery of the English language is not
a requirement of the work to be performed.2s Furthermore, the
Guidelines prohibit denying equal opportunity to individuals who,
as a class, fall outside the national norm for height and weight,
where such height and weight specifications are not necessary for
229. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
230. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
231. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
232. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
233. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(b) (1975).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the performance of the work involved.
B. THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED
The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 197311 contains provisions
regarding employment discrimination against the physically handi-
capped. The Act states that any government contract for property
or services in excess of $2,500 shall contain a provision that the
employer shall take affirmative action to employ and promote quali-
fied handicapped persons. 35 If a handicapped individual believes
that any contracting employer has failed to take appropriate affirm-
ative action, the individual may file a complaint with the Secretary
of Labor. The contracting agency shall promptly investigate the
complaint.26 The Secretary of Labor is empowered to take such
action as the circumstances warrant including cancellation, suspen-
sion and disbarment from future contracts.
C. VIETNAM VETERANS
The Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act of 1972237 requires
that government contractors take affirmative action to employ and
promote qualified veterans, including disabled veterans. The Act
would apply to employers who perform any contract for the procure-
ment of personal property and non-personal services (including con-
struction) for the United States. 28 A veteran who believes any
contractor has violated the Act may file a complaint with the Veter-
ans Employment Service of the Department of Labor. The Secre-
tary of Labor is empowered to take such action as the circumstances
warrant including cancellation, suspension and disbarment from
future contracts .39
D. EX-PRISONERS
Current judicial and legislative trends are to remove employment
restrictions on those with criminal records by requiring employers
to consider each applicant on an individual basis and by outlawing
234. 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
235. Id. § 793(a). Qualified handicapped individuals are defined by the Act. Id. § 706 (6).
236. Id. § 793(b).
237. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
238. Id. § 2012(a). For the Civil Service Commission's guide for affirmative action plans
required by this statute see CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTIcES GUIDE 3897.
239. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2012(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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the practice of disqualifying applicants solely on the existence of a
record. The requirement that job applicants not have criminal re-
cords operates to discriminate against minorities, since statistics
compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation show a disparate
percentage of minorities have criminal records. While conviction
records may in some instances have a bearing on the suitability of
a job applicant, the general rule is that "a conviction of a felony or
misdemeanor should not per se constitute an absolute bar to em-
ployment."' The EEOC takes the view that a discharge or refusal
to employ a minority-group person because of a conviction record
is unlawful under Title VII unless the particular circumstances of
the case, e.g., the time, nature and number of the convictions, indi-
cate that employment of the particular person for a particular job
is manifestly inconsistent with the safe and efficient operation of the
employer's business.4 If an employer can show that its policy of
denying employment to applicants with criminal convictions is
based upon sound business necessity, the policy will be upheld.242
The states have recently provided legislative remedies to combat
this discrimination. Hawaii has enacted a statute prohibiting
discrimination against ex-prisoners in private employment. 2 3 Con-
necticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, and Washington have
enacted statutes removing mandatory restrictions against ex-
prisoners in public employment. 4 In addition, various state and
city human rights commissions have enacted guidelines warning
employers of the potential discriminatory effects of inquiries con-
cerning job applicants' criminal records.245
E. EX-ADDICTS
There are no reported cases applying Title VII to job discrimina-
tion against ex-addicts. As with criminal convictions, the statistical
data indicates that a disproportionate number of heroin addicts
240. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
241. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 74-89, 1974 CCH EEOC DEC. 6418; EEOC Decision
No. 73-0257, 1972 CCH EEOC DEC. 6372; EEOC Decision No. 72-1497, 1973 CCH EEOC
DEC. 6352; EEOC Decision No. 72-1460; 1972 CCH EEOC'DEc. 6341.
242. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 381F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
243. HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 21, ch. 378, § 378-2(1) (Supp. 1974).
244. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-610 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.011 (Supp.
1974); OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT REV. 6 (Jan. 1974).
245. For a further discussion see Note, The Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment
Discrimination Against Ex-Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1403 (1975).
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come from racial and ethnic minority groups. Since an employer's
policy of refusing to hire rehabilitated drug addicts merely because
of their prior addiction could be established as having a greater
effect on minority groups than on whites, it would probably consti-
tute de facto discrimination.24
VII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
To ensure compliance with fair employment law, an employer is
urgently advised to design and implement an "affirmative action"
program. Such a program is a positive policy that goes well beyond
merely maintaining "neutral nondiscriminatory" employment prac-
tices. For example, an employer may hire applicants solely on their
qualifications, without regard to race, color, sex, national origin, or
religion. This is a "neutral" policy, but it may be discriminatory if
the source of the applicants is by referral from the existing work
force.247 Where, for instance, "word-of-mouth" recruiting effectively
excludes minorities, courts have ordered that the employer take the
affirmative action of advertising in media which will reach minority
group members.24 8
A. LEGAL SOURCES
Section 706(g) of Title VII authorizes the federal courts to enjoin
unlawful employment practices and to "order such affirmative ac-
tion as may be appropriate." '249 Executive Order 11375,50 covering
federal government contractors or subcontractors, has taken an
even stronger position.2 51 The courts have also required more than
246. This question becomes more complicated in view of the fact that most rehabilitated
addicts have conviction records. For a further discussion see Note, Employment Discrimina-
tion Against Rehabilitated Drug Addicts, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1974); Note, Heroin, Mari-
juana and Crime: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 119 (1970).
247. See section II. D. supra.
248. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1973).
249. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974). For a discussion of the forms that judicially man-
dated affirmative action may take see section IX.B. infra.
250. 3 C.F.R. 321 (1967), amending Executive Order 11246 § 202 (i), 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965)
(codified at 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974). As the language of the Executive Order implies, age discrimi-
nation has generally been excluded from the requirements of affirmative action. Title VII does
not mention discrimination based upon age, that being the subject of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970). The EEOC, charged with enforcement of
Title VII only, has not mandated affirmative action regarding age even though it has taken
a strong position regarding the factors enumerated in Title VII.
251. Executive Order 11375 provides in part:
The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
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neutral employment practices. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," 2 the
Supreme Court mandated a change when existing practices and
procedures, though neutral on their face and in their intent, oper-
ated to freeze the status quo of prior discrimination.
Affirmative action includes any practice or policy which posi-
tively seeks to ensure that minorities and women will be hired,
trained and promoted in such numbers as will ultimately reflect
their general proportion in the available labor market. Affirmative
action can be ordered by the courts23 or may also be part of a
consent decree or settlement agreement which settles a lawsuit or a
potential suit at an earlier stage. Such an agreement is often
reached during the conciliation period required by Title VII after
the EEOC has investigated, but before it has brought suit. '54
But affirmative action is not limited to judicial orders or formal
agreements with the EEOC. Many leading companies are institut-
ing, on their own initiative, company-wide affirmative action plans.
This section is a set of guidelines which should assist management
in developing its own affirmative action program. It is predicated
to a considerable degree on the specific recommendations of the
EEOC. 1 The most important guideline for an employer is to re-
duce every detail of the affirmative action program to written form
and to maintain a file on the administration of the program. In this
manner, if and when Title VII problems arise, the self-initiated
program might provide the basis and direction of any judicially-
mandated program that may subsequently evolve.
B. POLICY STATEMENT
A company executive should issue a statement that equal oppor-
tunity is a legal, social, and economic necessity and that affirmative
that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the
following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment
advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and
selection for training, including apprenticeship. 3 C.F.R. 321 (1967).
252. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
253. For a discussion of judicially directed affirmative action and other judicially-imposed
remedies see section IX. infra.
254. For a discussion of the conciliation process see section X.A.3., infra.
255. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQuAL
EMPLOYMENT (1974). See also The Affirmative Action Programs issued by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance (OFCC) 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1 et seq. (1975).
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action will be necessary to implement it. The statement should
point out that existing neutral employment policies might not be
adequate. Instead, the company must set goals just as it does in any
other program. Every existing employment practice must be re-
evaluated in the light of the affirmative action program. Affirmative
action should have a role in recruiting, hiring, promotion, transfer,
training, compensation, benefits, layoff, and termination. The
statement should further state that executives at all levels share in
the responsibility for the success of affirmative action.
Every supervisor and manager should be informed of his or her
responsibility under the program. In addition to explaining the legal
requirements of affirmative action, many companies have found it
useful to institute small informal discussion groups to acquaint
managers and supervisors with the problem of discriminatory
stereotypes and other barriers to fair employment. The company
policy statement and federal equal employment opportunity posters
should be placed in prominent areas. Section 711 of Title VII2 6
requires every employer to conspicuously post notices, available
from the EEOC, which highlight the provisions of Title VII. A sec-
ond notice summarizing the Age Discrimination Act should also be
prominently posted on the employer's premises. Title VII places
unions under an obligation to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices. If the company has a collective bargaining agreement
with a union, the union should be afforded an opportunity to make
suggestions for improving the affirmative action program.
C. SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT
The EEOC suggests that even Form EEO-1 is insufficiently de-
tailed for this self-analysis. 257 Rather, the Commission recommends
that jobs be classified as they are actually in use in the company,
in collective bargaining agreements, or on payroll records. The wage
rate (which is not requested on Form EEO-1) and responsibilities
should be listed for each job classification or subclassification. Sta-
tistics showing minority and female employment when compiled in
this manner better portray the status of the employer with regard
to Title VII. These statistics can be used to identify areas of "un-
256. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-10 (1974).
257. For an explanation of Form EEO-1 and a complete discussion of record-keeping re-
quirements see section VIII. infra.
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derutilization 255 and "concentration," ' s either of which indicates
a strong probability that discriminatory practices, even if inad-
vertent, are present in the employment system.
The statistics are useful only when compared to the concentration
of available minority and female employees in the relevant labor
market. An affirmative action program should contain "an area of
reasonable recruitment." Under EEOC Guidelines an employer lo-
cated in a predominantly white county some 30 miles from an urban
area with a substantial minority population should recruit in that
urban area.
The Affirmative Action Guidelines 60 issued by the Office of Fed-
eral Contract Compliance list several factors to determine whether
there is underutilization of minorities and females. The factors in-
clude the minority or female population in the labor area surround-
ing the facility, the percentage of these populations which are un-
employed, the size of these populations compared to the total work
force in the area, the general skills of these populations, and the
degree of training reasonably required and that which the employer
could reasonably afford to offer.2 1 The controlling factor in such a
determination is obviously the relevant labor market which varies
in each case. As the guidelines reflect, in evaluating the lower-entry
jobs it may include the geographic area from which the employer
might reasonably expect to draw applicants while in higher jobs it
might include only the existing employees who could be reasonably
characterized as promotable.6 2
The survey and analysis will be a starting point for instituting
appropriate employment goals. Compensation and benefits, usually
the easiest and quickest to change, should be standardized for all
employees who perform substantially similar work. A timetable
should be established for minority and female representation in
each classification which corresponds to the available number of
258. Underutilization implies the employment of fewer minority or female employees in the
classification than would be expected by reference to the relevant labor market.
259. Concentration refers to a disproportionately greater percentage of minorities in low-
level classifications and an equally disproportionate percentage of white males in high-level
classifications.
260. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 et seq. (1975).
261. For other factors relevant in a survey of classifications see 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b)
(1975).
262. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b)(2) (1975).
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minority and female employees. The concept of eligibility should be
reanalyzed to insure that all prerequisites which may hinder the
employment or advancement of minorities and females can be justi-
fied as essential to the safe and efficient operation of the employer's
business. 23 Federal courts have consistently upheld the legality of
goals and timetables, instituted to remedy past discriminatory ef-
fects and which do not require that an employer hire or promote any
individual who is not qualified for the particular job.264
D. DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
The survey and analysis may indicate the underutilization of
minorities and females in particular job titles. In that instance, the
entire employment process must be reviewed to identify the causes
of underutilization. This review invariably reveals that there is more
to underutilization than the familiar refrain of unavailable or un-
qualified candidates.
1. Recruitment
The recruitment procedure for each job category should be care-
fully reviewed to ascertain whether any artificial discriminatory
barriers exist. For example, hiring by "word-of-mouth" should be
eliminated"'5 since relying upon recommendations of the existing
work force tends to perpetuate the composition of the existing force.
While it is virtually impossible and not altogether desirable to elimi-
nate subjective factors, every employee involved in recruitment and
interviewing should be trained to use objective, job-related stan-
dards. 6 ' All advertising should include the phrase "Equal Oppor-
tunity Employer, MF." Copy of the ads should be carefully re-
viewed to ensure that no preference for race, sex or age is indicated.
Advertisements should be inserted in media which will reach
263. For a discussion of the business necessity exception as it affects racial discrimina-
tion, which is equally applicable to other forms of discrimination under Title VII, see text
accompanying notes 225-30 supra.
264. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 1974).
265. See section II.D. supra.
266. An "Applicant Flow Record" should be established for each job applicant. This record
should contain the position applied for as well as the race, color, national origin, sex, age,
referral source, and date of application. The Applicant Flow Record should indicate whether
a job offer was made and if not, why. The person making the employment decision should
be identified. These records should be used to assemble quarterly reports of the percentages
of minority applicants and total minority hirings by job classification.
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women and minorities. If reliance is placed upon an employment
agency, a statement in writing should be made to the agency that
the company is seeking qualified minorities and women. Recruiting
visits to colleges with a large enrollment of minorities should be
scheduled. Contacts should be developed with community organiza-
tions representing the interests of minorities and women. The Re-
gional EEOC offices can provide a list of existing training programs
in the community which may be able to supply qualified applicants.
2. Job-Related Standards and Qualifications
The EEOC maintains that any employee-selection procedure
which has a statistically adverse effect on minorities and females
will be unlawful unless (a) it is significantly related to job perfor-
mance and (b) there is no alternative nondiscriminatory stan-
dard." The courts tend to require only the first standard-that the
qualification be significantly related to job performance.268
Employee-selection standards include all written tests as well as
any biographical and educational data such as the requirement of
a high school diploma.219
Each step of the selection process, not only for hiring but also for
promotion or transfer, must be reviewed to insure that it either does
not hinder the employment or advancement of minorities and
women or can be validated as job-related. The EEOC has identified
the key steps to be monitored indicating the effect of each activity
by race, color, national origin and sex. ° "Validation" is a technical
267. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1975).
268. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). But see Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
269. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975). See also text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
270. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975). Observe the omission of religion, which is ordinarily not
included in affirmative action plans. As noted in the textual discussion on religion, see section
V. supra, the main issue has been the degree of accommodation necessary to an employee's
(or applicant's) inability to work on given days. This is not to say that an underrepresentation
of particular religious groups in certain industries (for example banks and financial institu-
tions) would not create an affirmative action duty.
Furthermore, employers are generally not considered to be under an affirmative action duty
with respect to age. Age discrimination is not under the jurisdiction of either the EEOC (Title
VII) or the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (Executive Order 11246), both of which
are actively involved with affirmative action. See note 250 supra. But more fundamentally,
age discrimination is more susceptible to eradication by "neutral" policies with respect to
all employees and applicants; in the current stage of the evolution of discrimination law, it
is not generally considered necessary that employers actively recruit, hire, train, and promote
older workers.
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term for a complex process of demonstrating that a particular test
or qualification is sufficiently job-related to make that test valid.
Validation is required only where an existing selection procedure
disproportionately screens out minorities and females. Once man-
agement becomes aware of a disproportionate impact caused by a
prerequisite, the validation process should begin. To begin the pro-
cess each affected job should be analyzed to pinpoint the actual
tasks performed, their frequency, and the importance of specific
traits or skills used on the job.
Job descriptions and hiring standards should reflect the major
functions of a particular job title and should not require higher
qualifications than an employee needs to perform the job. The
Guidelines of the EEOC state that selection standards should not
be geared to future promotion unless there is a high probability that
employees will attain a higher level job within a reasonable period
of time.Y' Furthermore, women and minorities cannot be required
to meet any selection standards which were not required in the past
for employees now performing these jobs in a satisfactory manner.
Under the EEOC Guidelines, validation is a technical and com-
plex process requiring not only trained industrial psychologists, but
a statistically adequate employee sample. 272 If feasible, the Guide-
lines require criterion-related validation to show that those workers
who are highly rated under a test or selection standard generally
perform successfully on the job, while those who score low usually
are not successful on the job. Criterion validation necessitates a
large sample of applicants.2 3 Content validation evidences that the
test is an actual sample of the work to be done, such as typing for a
secretarial position, while construct validation refers to whether the
test or qualification measures some characteristic necessary to the
job. These latter methods are less burdensome and costly, but less
reliable in the eyes of the EEOC.
Questions on application forms or pre-employment inquiries con-
cerning race, national origin, and religion should be avoided. Inquir-
ies about sex and age may be made if a statement of non-
271. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(1) (1975).
272. Id. §§ 1607.4, .5 (1975). For many medium-sized or small companies it is not practica-
ble to obtain the services of trained industrial psychologists to validate job qualifications.
Under the circumstances, such employers are taking reasonably protective measures by con-
ducting a written evaluation of job functions and qualifications and heeding those results.
273. Id. § 1607.5.
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discrimination appears at the bottom of the application form.24
Inquiry should not be made about arrest records (as distinguished
from convictions).275 Questions about credit information, credit rat-
ings, charge accounts, home or car ownership (unless a car is essen-
tial to the job) tend to disproportionately disqualify minorities and
may be unlawful unless there is a valid business necessity.27 Infor-
mation regarding marital and family status should be used nar-
rowly-as an indicator of an individual's stability. The EEOC be-
lieves that any questions on marital or family status are subject to
abuse, and that the relevant information on job stability can be
more reliably obtained elsewhere.77 The Commission observes that
turnover is more a function of job level than marital status. The
employer should eliminate height and weight requirements since
they disproportionately screen out women and individuals of His-
panic or Oriental extraction.2 8 The prevailing view among courts is
to permit employers to refuse to hire males with long hair; 79 how-
ever, minorities with "Afro" hairstyles should be considered. 20 The
courts state that both men and women are held to the same stan-
dard-that of being neat and well-groomed.
3. Job Mobility-Assignment, Promotion, Transfer and Training
The basic principles of affirmative action for hiring and recruit-
ment are again applicable; if statistical analysis has indicated areas
of underutilization, then artificial barriers must be identified. A
formal employee evaluation program based upon objective, measur-
able factors should be developed. In this manner, minorities and
females qualified for promotions will be identified. Job performance
and length of service of unpromoted minorities and women can be
compared with the qualifications of other employees who have re-
ceived promotions to measure the effectiveness of the program. If
transfers or promotions are made a part of the affirmative action
274. See id. § 860.95(a).
275. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). See section II.C. supra.
276. EEOC Decision No. 72-0427, 1971 CCH EEOC Dec. 6312; 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.24(d)(3)
(1975).
277. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT 42 (1974).
278. EEOC Decision No. 71-1418, 1971 CCH EEOC Dec. 6223.
279. Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Willingham v.
Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
280. See case cited note 74 supra.
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program, affected employees should be allowed to retain their sen-
iority and wage rates to encourage utilization of the program.
Many jobs can be performed with relatively minimal, inexpensive
training. The EEOC states that management training should be a
high priority goal in an affirmative action program, especially in
view of the small number of minorities and females in manage-
ment.28' To achieve this end, a program for career counseling is
helpful to encourage employees to qualify for better jobs, particu-
larly at the management level; but care should be used to insure
that the program does not produce results which favor one race or
sex over another.28 2
4. Layoff, Recall, Discharge and Discipline
All terminations and disciplinary actions should be monitored. If
they disproportionately affect minorities and women, the causes
should be identified. If there is not a compelling business reason for
it, the procedure should be changed. Layoff and recall, even if in
accordance with an existing collective bargaining agreement, may
not be made along job or departmental lines if this policy in fact
disproportionately affects minorities and women or curtails their
willingness to be transferred or promoted because of the sacrifice of
seniority.2 3 In some instances, affirmative action is required even
when the layoffs and recalls are made by establishment or employ-
ment seniority.284 Whether unionized or not, the company which is
faced with a reduction in force might wish to consider (and negotiate
with the union for) a shortened work week or work day to avoid
layoffs.
E. REVISION OF UNION CONTRACT
Although every collective bargaining agreement should contain a
nondiscrimination clause,285 an employer may not rely upon a labor
contract to justify discriminatory practices. The contract should be
281. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 255, at 51.
282. Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 10 F.E.P. Cases 251 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1975).
283. See section III.D. 2 supra.
284. See Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). See also text accompanying notes 56-66 supra.
285. For a discussion of the use of the collective bargaining agreement as a tool of enforce-
ment for Title VII see section XI. H. infra.
[Vol. 10:209
LAW OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT
surveyed as company policies would be. Areas in the contract which
are in real or potential conflict with Title VII such as departmental
seniority or restrictions on maternity leave and pregnancy should be
clearly identified. Management and the union should discuss the
changes in the labor contract that must be made to comply with fair
employment laws. If a provision of the contract clearly discrimi-
nates, and the union is unwilling to rectify it, the employer never-
theless may make the change. To do so is not an unlawful refusal
to bargain.2"6 If the union is unwilling, and the employer fears a
strike or other job action, either the employer or interested employ-
ees can file an unfair labor practice charge, or the latter may file a
complaint with the EEOC. Moreover, the employer can bring suit
in its own name under section 301(a) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.287
VIII. RECORDKEEPING AND ACCESS TO RECORDS
The recordkeeping requirements of Title VII are twofold: (1) em-
ployers must preserve all personnel records; (2) employers with 100
or more employees must prepare and retain records necessary to
complete the Employer Information Report EEO-1 (Form EEO-1).
A. PRESERVATION OF RECORDS
All employers must retain personnel or employment records.
These shall include, but not be limited to, application forms and
records of hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, layoff or termina-
tion, rates of pay or other terms of compensation, and selection for
training or apprenticeship.2 No records need be kept which relate
to application forms and other pre-employment records of appli-
cants for positions which are of a temporary or seasonal nature and
known by the applicants to be such."9
These records shall be preserved for six months from the date the
record was made or from the date of personnel action, whichever
occurred later. In the case of involuntary termination, the personnel
records shall be kept for six months from the date of termination.29
286. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.21(a)(6), (7) (1975).
287. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970); cf. Jersey Central Power and Light Co. v. IBEW Local
Unions, 508 F.2d 687, 698 n.31 (3d Cir. 1975).
288. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14(a) (1975).
289. Id. § 1602.14(b).
290. Id. § 1602.14(a).
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Where a charge of discrimination has been filed, a complaint issued,
or a judicial action initiated, all personnel records relating to the
case shall be preserved until the final disposition of the case.291
Although EEOC regulations require that records be preserved for
only six months, the Age Discrimination Act 9 2 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act293 require longer recordkeeping periods. The agencies
involved-the EEOC for Title VII and the Wage-Hour Administra-
tion for the Age Discrimination and Wage-Hour Act-have not
officially reconciled the inconsistencies among the various
recordkeeping requirements. To ensure compliance with all record-
keeping requirements, the employer is advised to preserve for three
years those records indicating name, address, date of birth, job title,
working hours (daily and weekly), rate of pay or basis upon which
compensation is paid, total daily or weekly straight-time earnings,
total weekly overtime compensation, additions to or deductions
from wages paid during the pay period, total wages paid each pay
period, date of the payment due and the date when payment was
made. Records of hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, layoff or
termination, selection for training, the results of any employment
test or physical examination used in connection with any personnel
action, and advertisements or notices pertaining to personnel ac-
tions should be maintained for one year.
B. FORM EEO-1
Form EEO-1 was developed jointly by the EEOC and the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance as a single form to satisfy the sta-
tistical reporting requirements of both Title VII and Executive
Order 11246. Only employers with 100 or more employees must file
Form EEO-1;2 14 an employer of this size is presumed to be in an
industry "affecting commerce" and is, therefore, covered by Title
VII.95 Certain employers having fewer than 100 employees are sub-
ject to Title VII and must file Form EEO-1 if "the company is
owned by or affiliated with another company; if there is centralized
ownership, control, and management, such as central control of
291. Id.
292. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970). See 29 C.F.R. § 850.3 (1975) (three years).
293. 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. (1965). See 29 C.F.R. § 516.5 (1975) (certain records to be
preserved for three years); id. § 516.6 (certain records to be preserved for two years).
294. 29 C.F.R. § 602.7 (1975).
295. 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 2173 (1975).
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personnel policies and labor relations, that the group legally consti-
tutes a single enterprise; and if the entire enterprise employs a total
of 100 or more employees. 298
Prior instructions to Form EEO-1 required an employer covered
by Executive Order 11246 to file the form irrespective of any report-
ing it had done to comply with state or local fair employment laws.
The instructions currently in force297 are silent on this point. The
present instructions are similarly silent on whether an employer
covered only by Title VII, and not by Executive Order 1246, must
file Form EEO-1. Prior instructions provided that such an employer
was relieved of the obligation to file. Due to this silence, it is not
certain whether compliance with state recordkeeping requirements
is adequate. Precaution would dictate compliance with both since
a "fundamental policy of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act is to avoid federal action whenever possible by making the state
a partner in the enforcement of Title VII." ' 5
Form EEO-1 requires a chart of the number of minority and fe-
male employees for certain categories as well as the total number
of employees in each job title. Employers may maintain post-
employment records as to the identity of employees. However, the
EEOC recommends that permanent records of employees' racial or
ethnic identities be separately maintained for the purpose of com-
pleting Form EEO-1.99
C. CONFIDENTIALITY
Section 709(e) of Title VII makes it unlawful for any officer or
employee of the EEOC to make public "in any manner whatever"
any information obtained by the Commission."' Such proscription
exists only until proceedings are commenced by the EEOC against
an employer. As a practical matter, the degree of confidentiality is
often severely limited. This can be traced to two factors: (1) the
296. Id. at 1650-51. In addition, multi-establishment employers must file: (a) a report for
each establishment where 25 or more persons are employed; (b) a report covering the principal
office or headquarters; and (c) a Consolidated Report listing all establishments employing
fewer than 25 employees. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a)(3) (1975).
297. See 1975 Employer Information Report EEO-1, 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE
T 2173 (1975).
298. EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
299. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.13 (1975).
300. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-8(e) (1974).
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potential number of parties in a discrimination suit and (2) the
Freedom of Information Act.30 ' The Fifth Circuit has ruled that
section 709(e) does not prohibit the EEOC from divulging such
information to the parties involved or to their attorneys.3 12 Since it
often happens in discrimination suits that the plaintiff or one of the
plaintiffs is an organization involved on a full-time basis with dis-
crimination, such information is thereby often publicized.
The Freedom of Information Act, enacted to encourage disclosure
of official information obtained by federal agencies, may effectively
negate the right to confidentiality. A United States district court,
relying on the Freedom of Information Act, has held that section
709(e) of Title VII does not prevent the disclosure of Form EEO-1,
filed with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance pursuant to
Executive Order 11246, to an organization known as the Council on
Economic Priorities." Since section 709(e) is a criminal statute in
that it makes disclosure a misdemeanor punishable by fine or
imprisonment, the court strictly construed it to refer specifically
and solely to the EEOC and not to the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance. However, the court did order that the company could
introduce evidence demonstrating that certain information in its
affirmative action plan submitted to the agency might give its com-
petitors access to inside information and, therefore, all or part of the
affirmative action plan could be protected from disclosure.
D. ACCESS TO EVIDENCE
Section 706(b) of Title VII provides that charges or information
cannot be made public by the EEOC without written consent of
the persons concerned. 4 In Parker v. EEOC,0 5 the plaintiff sought
copies of all pre-determination settlement and conciliation agree-
ments made during a particular month by the EEOC, the names of
persons who filed discrimination complaints and employers and
labor organizations charged with discrimination. Although the
documents sought were not specifically exempted from disclosure
by Title VII and although the court said that the Freedom of In-
301. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
302. H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
939 (1973).
303. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C.), stay of order dissolved, 509
F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
304. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (1974).
305. 10 F.E.P. Cases 878 (D.S.C. 1974).
[Vol. 10:209
LAW OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT
formation Act "represents a strong legislature policy advocating
broad disclosure of government records and exemptions under the
Act are to be narrowly construed,""3 6 the disclosure was prohibited.
The court reasoned that both types of agreements are part of "in-
formal endeavors" which fall within Title VIl's cloak of confiden-
tiality, since both are negotiated prior to any formal court action
and with an eye toward avoiding litigation.
The EEOC has the lawful right of access at reasonable times to
examine and copy any evidence or to interrogate any person with
respect to unlawful employment practices.0 7 Section 710 of Title
VII,3°s by reference to section 161 of Title 29,309 grants the EEOC
further authorization to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance
and testimony of witnesses or the production of any requested data.
The courts appear reluctant to sustain objections to information
which the EEOC requests. In Circle K Corporation, Inc. v. EEOC,
3 1
the Commission's request for evidence was upheld over the com-
pany's objection that compliance with the request would be unduly
burdensome. The relevant factor in the court's decision was not
whether production of the requested information would be costly
and time-consuming, but whether the information requested was
relevant to the EEOC's investigation. However, a demand for access
to evidence against an employer that operated seven retail depart-
ment stores was limited to the store from which the plaintiff was
discharged, since each store was a separate hiring unit.
311
Once a complaint of discrimination has been filed in federal
court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available to both
parties. The Federal Rules are liberal in permitting access to re-
cords, witnesses, and other relevant information in preparation for
trial.312 The basic test of whether information is subject to this pro-
cess of discovery is relevance. The information is discoverable if it
is admissible or "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence. ' 31 3 Rule 26(c) permits a party or the
306. Id. at 880.
307. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.14 to .18 (1975).
308. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-9 (1974).
309. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).
310. 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974).
311. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973).
312. Discovery is also available before commencement of the suit. FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a).
313. Id. 26(b).
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person from whom discovery is sought to obtain a protective order
from the court to limit or prohibit discovery." 4 Two of the typical
grounds for such protective orders are that the discovery requested
is not relevant to the case or that the requested information would
reveal a trade secret or other confidential information. 5
In General Insurance Company of America v. EEOC,316 the Ninth
Circuit held that the EEOC's demand for access to evidence was too
broad to be "relevant or material to the charge[s] under investiga-
tion" within the meaning of section 710(a). The demand reached
back in time nearly eight years and sought evidence going to forms
of discrimination not even charged or alleged. In Motorola, Inc. v.
EEOC,37 however, an employer charged with discrimination was
ordered to provide the EEOC with: (a) a list of existing job classi-
fications with a staffing breakdown as to minority group composi-
tion; (b) a list of new hirings and promotions for two specified years,
including the job classification and race or ethnic grouping of each
individual; (c) access to any agent or employee for interviews rele-
vant to the Commissioner's charge; and (d) an opportunity to tour
and observe the employees at work in all of the employer's facilities
in the area.
The parties in a Title VII case may obtain discovery by a variety
of methods. Perhaps the most important method is written inter-
rogatories which must be answered "separately and fully in writing
under oath.118 When faced with a substantial list of interrogatories,
the employer again has the right to petition for a protective order if
the interrogatories are too broad or the preparation of answers re-
quires an unreasonable amount of time and an unreasonable ex-
penditure of money by defendant. 19
IX. REMEDIES
The key to effective enforcement is effective remedies. Section
706(g) of Title VIP2 ° authorizes the federal courts to choose from a
broad range of remedies if the court determines that the employer
314. Id. 26(c).
315. See, e.g., Crockett v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974).
316. 491 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1974).
317. 5 F.E.P. Cases 1379 (D. Ariz. 1973).
318. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
319. Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 586, 591 (D. Md. 1974).
320. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
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has committed or is committing unlawful employment practices.
The court's resulting order can be so extensive as to cause considera-
ble expense and change in operating procedures to the employer.2 '
A. PROSCRIBING RETALIATION
Section 704(a)"2 protects individuals from reprisals because of
opposition to unlawful employment practices. This opposition may
manifest itself in several forms: filing of complaints with adminis-
trative agencies or courts; disobeying orders; filing grievances; pick-
eting; and encouraging boycotts. In Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co.,323 a black employee who had filed a complaint against his
employer with the EEOC was allegedly suspended for engaging in
an altercation with a fellow worker. He was then discharged after
alleging that his employer had bribed an EEOC investigator. The
employee petitioned for injunctive relief, claiming that his dismissal
was in retaliation for his opposition to racial discrimination. In
granting the claim, the Fifth Circuit said that the bribery charge
was protected, even though it may have contained malicious mate-
rial.3 4 The court further stated that "exceptionally broad protec-
tion" was intended for those employees whose actions fell within
section 704(a).
In order to establish a prima facie violation of section 704(a), the
complainant must establish that: (a) he has opposed employment
discrimination or has participated in a proceeding in which an em-
ployment practice is alleged to be unlawful under Title VII; (b) he
has been discriminated against by the respondent; and (c) the dis-
crimination took place because of the complainant's opposition or
participation. Intention being the determinative factor, the em-
ployee has the burden of proving that he had the intent to "oppose"
321. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974).
322. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (1974).
323. 411 F.2d 998, petition for rehearing denied, 415 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1969). See also 11
A.L.R. Fed. 302 (1972).
324. The court reached this conclusion in light of the purpose of section 704(a):
In unmistakable language it is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided
by Congress to protect his rights. The Act will be frustrated if the employer may
unilaterally determine the truth or falsity of charges and take independent action. Id.
at 1005.
The federal courts possess inherent equitable powers to protect from reprisal litigants whose
administrative or judicial actions are pending disposition. See Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974); Pennsylvania v. Engineers Local
542, 347 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
within the meaning of section 704(a). Threatening to oppose dis-
criminatory acts, either by filing formal complaints or by engaging
in forms of concerted activity, may constitute "opposition. '" ' 5 In
addition, the complainant must show a difference between the
treatment given him by his employer before and after his opposi-
tion, or a difference between the treatment of himself after his oppo-
sition and the treatment of nonopposers and that the employer had
received notice of the opposition. Employers commonly defend
agairst charges of retaliation by claiming that they had "indepen-
dent grounds" for their action.321
B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
Section 706(g) of Title VII 27 empowers the courts to enjoin an
employer or labor union or employment agency from engaging in
any unlawful employment practice.3 28 A mere prohibition of future
discrimination is not usually sufficient. Employment practices,
neutral on their face, become suspect and many times unlawful
because of their tendency to lock in the effects of the past. The
courts therefore are also empowered to "order such affirmative ac-
tion as may be appropriate. '329
Courts have ordered the immediate offer of a position or promo-
tion to an employee who has suffered discrimination. Illustrative of
this remedy is a case where an individual was not hired because of
a refusal, on religious grounds, to work on Fridays. 3 1 Pending possi-
ble accommodation between the parties, the court directed the indi-
vidual's immediate employment. In another case involving a far-
reaching modification of a discriminatory seniority system, a federal
court ordered a company-without laying off any other employ-
ees-to recall immediately all black employees laid off under the old
seniority plan until the racial percentage of the work force equalled
that which existed when the last employee was hired.33 These cases
325. EEOC Decision No. 71-2338, 1971 CCH EEOC Decisions % 6247.
326. For a further discussion see Spurlock, Proscribing Retaliation Under Title VII, 8 IND.
L. REv. 453 (1975).
327. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
328. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 243-51, petition for
rehearing denied, 494 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1974).
329. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974). See also section VII. A., supra.
330. Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 8 F.E.P. Cases 315 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d
1397 (4th Cir. 1974).
331. Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d
41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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illustrate that despite expense to the employer, the remedies of Title
VII available to individual plaintiffs are to be quickly instituted.
In addition to the immediate hiring or promotion of individual
plaintiffs, the courts have usually ordered that numerical goals be
established for hiring and promotion "to eradicate the effects of past
discriminatory practices. ' 1 2 In interpreting either Title VII or
Executive Order 11246, eight circuits have upheld such numerical
goals.33 This judicial development is somewhat surprising in view
of section 7030) of Title VII334 which was originally thought to ex-
clude hiring based upon fixed percentages. Goals may also be linked
to a particular hiring ratio. Thus, to remedy discriminatory prac-
tices which previously excluded minorities from certain positions,
the court in United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc.35 ordered that
foremen be selected by merit from a roster of eligible candidates, the
roster being open equally to whites and blacks. The court directed
that a one-white-to-one-black hiring ratio be utilized until 15 blacks
held the foreman position.
Stated simply, "[r]acial quotas, generally, are viewed in our law
with suspicion. They tend to freeze official conduct in the future by
reference to yesterday's conditions. ' 36 When a remedy is fashioned
on a class quota basis, it leads to insoluble problems and piles
discrimination on top of discrimination. For this reason employers
should avoid all quota systems for minority and female employees.
The courts have gone to great lengths to avoid labeling plans as
332. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 630 (2d Cir. 1974).
333. Morrow v. Chrisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 361 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 490
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); United States v. N.L. Industries,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en
banc); United States v. IBEW Local 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Lathers Union Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United
States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
854 (1971); United States v. IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
943 (1970); Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
334. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j) (1974).
335. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
7 F.E.P. Cases 710, 749 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
336. Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 10 F.E.P. Cases 251 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1975). See also Lige v.
Town of Montclair, 10 F.E.P. Cases 1075, 1077 (N.J. Super. 1975).
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"quotas," so that their validity may be upheld.37 The Second Cir-
cuit sustained a trial court's determination that a percentage goal
for nonwhites be achieved in three years .33 The case was remanded,
however, to redetermine what figure was appropriate. The lower
court had examined the nonwhite percentages in the total popula-
tion. The court of appeals explained that more relevant was the
percentage of nonwhites over 18 years old in the work force. Further,
the court expanded the geographic area from which minority group
statistics were to be obtained to include the suburbs as well as the
city. 3 39
The same considerations have been applied when the unlawful
act was a failure to promote or transfer. Judicially-mandated trans-
fer systems usually require employers to allow "rate retention" and
"seniority carryover" to encourage their full utilization.34 Other-
wise, past discrimination would continue not because of a policy of
segregation but because of the economic disincentives to transfer.
Other aspects of the employment situation are equally susceptible
to change by affirmative action. Courts have ordered employers to
institute training programs which qualify minorities for the better
jobs,34' to actively recruit minority applicants, 42 to revise testing
and selection procedures that showed a disparate impact on minori-
ties, 43 and to merge existing seniority systems which reflected prior
job segregation.3"
C. BACK PAY
The Supreme Court recently stated that back pay should usually
be awarded in cases where there is a finding of unlawful discrimina-
tion. 45 This expansive view of back pay was explained by the Fifth
337. See Firebird Soc. v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 10 F.E.P. Cases 593, 598 (D. Conn. 1975),
in which the court labeled a settlement agreement placing a certain number of blacks on a
city fire department's promotion eligibility list as "interim priority relief."
338. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 2369, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
339. For the position of the Office of Federal Compliance see text accompanying note 262
supra.
340. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 660 (2d Cir. 1971).
341. See, e.g., Frank v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S.
Ct. 625 (1974), petition for rehearing denied, 95 S. Ct. 1417 (1975).
342. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 926 (5th Cir. 1973).
343. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 365 F.Supp. 655, 662 (D. Mass. 1973).
344. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974). See also
section II.B. supra.
345. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S.Ct. 2363, 2372 (1975).
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Circuit:
Under Title VII . . . the injured workers must be restored to the
economic position in which they would have been but for the dis-
crimination-their "rightful place." Because of the compensatory
nature of a back pay award and because of the "rightful place"
theory, adopted by the courts, and of the strong congressional policy,
embodied in Title VII, for remedying employment discrimination,
the scope of a court's discretion to deny back pay is narrow. 4
The courts have been applying the back pay remedy with
extraordinary flexibility.347 It is even possible for an individual who
has not formally applied for work to be entitled to back pay. In one
case a black employee suffered an injury which prevented him from
performing his normal work.348 The injury was not serious enough to
have hindered him in the performance of less strenuous jobs re-
served for white workers. Back pay was ordered even though the
employee did not apply for any of those jobs. The employee success-
fully maintained that he knew from years of experience that apply-
ing for a less physically demanding job would be fruitless.
Prior cases held that back pay in Title VII class actions could be
awarded only to individually named plaintiffs, as opposed to class
members generally. Recent cases, on the other hand, have taken the
position that an individual plaintiff in a Title VII class action for
injunctive relief may properly assert both his own claim for back pay
and that of other class members similarly affected by the alleged
346. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 252, petition for rehearing
denied, 494 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1974).
347. Back pay has been awarded when various types of employment practices exist. See,
e.g., Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (discriminatory
termination through retirement); Rock v. Norfolk & West. Ry., 473 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 933 (1973) (discriminatory hiring practices); Danner v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 447 F.2d 159, rehearing denied, 450 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1971) (discriminatory termina-
tion through layoff); Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 329 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (on-the-
job discrimination with respect to seniority, promotion and transfer rights, allowance of
overtime work, and rate of pay); United States v. Lathers Union Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), af'd, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (discrimina-
tory practices of labor unions); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc:, 4 F.E.P. Cases
33 (W.D. Ky. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972) (discriminatory termination through
discharge).
As with on-the-job discrimination, this rule is not uniform. See United States v. N.L.
Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973). Some courts have refused to award back pay
even though a violation of Title VII was found. See Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d
441 (5th Cir. 1973).
348. Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971).
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discriminatory employment practices, regardless of whether such
class members have exhausted EEOC remedies.349 In a class action
for back pay claims when the class representative-plaintiff has set-
tled his own claim with the defendant or has not succeeded in estab-
lishing his individual right to relief, the class action may neverthe-
less still be maintained and the class members' back pay claims
asserted. Such is the case even though the class representative-
plaintiff is not himself eligible for such relief. '0 Recent cases also
hold that the federal government, when it brings a civil suit, may
seek back pay relief for victims of discriminatory practices; the
amount of the award may be determined in the same action that
establishes the unlawfulness of the particular practice."' The courts
usually approve negotiation between the named parties to out-of-
court settlements of all back pay claims in a class action despite
objections of some members of the class.3 51
Since the object of a back pay award is to effect restitution, such
award will not be limited to "straight time pay" but will include
overtime and premium pay, and will further take into account raises
and promotions which would have been earned. For example, the
effect of promotions can be included in the computation of back pay
even though precise calculation is impossible. Approximations can
be made by averaging the salary history of similarly situated em-
ployees "3 and interest may be included at the prevailing legal rate. 3
The usual measure of damages in back pay cases is the amount the
claimant would have earned in the absence of unlawful discrimina-
tion, reduced by the "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence."355 The cases conflict as to whether unemploy-
ment compensation received by a claimant should be deducted from
his back pay award. Back pay in a Title VII action cannot accumu-
late more than two years prior to the filing of charges with the
349. For example, in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1974), classwide back pay was available upon proper factual proof of an individual's claim,
and demonstrated deprivations based on racial discrimination by the employer affecting the
aggrieved class.
350. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d ,21 (8th Cir. 1970).
351. See, e.g., United States v. AMBAC Indus., Inc., 3 E.P.D. 1 8210 (D. Mass. 1971).
352. Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1974).
353. Hodgson v. Cook, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 941 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
354. Peters v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 3 F.E.P. Cases 792 (E.D. Texas 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d
490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
355. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
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EEOC.31 While an individual is awarded back pay from the date he
should have been hired or promoted, most courts have refused to
award retroactive seniority from that date.3 15 The Sixth Circuit re-
cently observed, however, that nothing in Title VII prohibits such
an award. 5 In remanding a case to the trial court, the appellate
court also observed that merely because back pay is appropriate
does not justify retroactive seniority. The lower court, in dealing
with seniority, must consider the interests of other workers and not
just the interests of the employer.
Various defenses have been asserted against back pay awards, the
major one being that the defendant did not "intentionally" violate
the statute. This defense is based upon the language of section
706(g), which authorizes an award of back pay "if the court finds
that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in" an unlawful employment practice.3 15 The courts gener-
ally have refused to consider the lack of intent to discriminate as a
valid defense.3 16 Good-faith reliance on state "protective" statutes,
such as those which limit women's hours or lifting requirements, is
usually upheld as a valid defense.361 Under section 713(b) of Title
VII,362 reliance on EEOC written interpretations or opinions is a
valid defense against the award of back pay, but the document
relied upon must strictly conform to the EEOC regulations under
that section. 63
356. Id. See also EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 239, 249 (6th Cir. 1975). In
an action brought to recover back wages under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d)
(1965), the same time period applies unless the violation is willful in which case the period is
three years. "Willful" means intentional and the courts have found such violations are easily
discoverable. See note 196 supra. A back pay award under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is not restricted
by the limitation in Title VII. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 176 (1975).
357. See, e.g., United States v. Detroit Edison Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 239 (6th Cir. 1975);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1421
(1975).
358. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975).
359. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
360. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the term "intentional" means that defendants in-
tended to do what they did, not that there was a willful and deliberate intention to violate
the law. Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (D. Ore. 1974). See
also Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 497 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 826
(1975).
361. Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 341 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1972).
362. 42 U.S.C.A. § 200e-12(b) (1974).
363. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971).
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The present good-faith efforts of a defendant to eliminate past
discriminatory employment practices have generally not been rec-
ognized as a defense against award of back pay in a Title VII ac-
tion.364 Even the unsettled state of the law as to back pay awards to
discriminatees under Title VII is generally not a valid defense
against an award of back pay. 65 Failure of the plaintiff to make a
timely request for back pay has previously been asserted success-
fully as a defense against court consideration of back pay awards
under Title VII, but recent authority holds that such a failure
should not prejudice the right to recover back pay. 66 In arbitration
proceedings under a collective bargaining agreement, a final deci-
sion adverse to a back pay claimant does not preclude that claimant
from asserting his right to relief from allegedly discriminatory em-
ployment practices in judicial proceedings under Title VII.67
A claimant for back pay under Title VII must establish that he
has suffered actual monetary damage as a result of the discrimina-
tory employment practice in question, and this requirement applies
to each member of a class.3 8 However, the courts refuse to consider
the difficulty of determining eligibility for, or amounts of, individ-
ual back pay awards as a defense against an award of back pay once
unlawful discrimination under Title VII has been established. 69
The Sixth Circuit has refused to award punitive damages against
364. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2374 (1975). The Court noted,
"[ulnder Title VII, the mere absence of bad faith simply opens the door to equity; it does
not depress the scales in the employer's favor." Thus the Court held that "given a finding of
a violation of Title VII, back pay should be denied only for reasons that would not frustrate
the central purposes of Title VI-of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and
making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."
365. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
366. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 121 (5th Cir. 1972).
367. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), in which back pay claims
were not barred by an adverse arbitration decision because in arbitration an employee seeks
to vindicate his rights under a collective bargaining agreement, while under Title VII he
asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress.
368. See United States v. Lathers Union Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd,
471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
369. See, e.g., Mill Workers Local 186 v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284
(N.D. Ind. 1969). Other defenses to back pay awards have been rejected. See Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (finding by
EEOC of "no reasonable cause" at administrative level); King v. Laborers Local 818,443 F.2d
273 (6th Cir. 1971) (discrimination not the sole cause of the act for which recovery was
sought); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971) (failure of claimant
to demand reinstatement).
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the employer. 70 Referring to section 706(g) of Title VII which confers
upon the federal courts broad remedial powers, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that no authority had been found in section 706(g) for the
award of punitive damages. "We know of no authority which holds
that the awarding of punitive damages is equitable relief. '371 At the
district court level, a majority of courts have followed this reasoning
and have also denied punitive damages.37 2
D. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COURT COSTS
Attorneys' fees have been awarded under section 706(k) of Title
V1173 to the prevailing party, other than the EEOC or the United
States, as part of the costs of the action. Such awards are not infre-
quent; paying for plaintiff's attorneys' fees, according to the courts,
encourages the bringing of suits which discriminatees would other-
wise be unable to afford.3 4 While a rare occurrence, section 706(k)
also authorizes a court to award attorneys' fees to employers when
bringing suit against the EEOC.3 5
Although statutory language plainly states that the allowance of
attorneys' fees is discretionary with the court, a prevailing plaintiff
is usually entitled to the award while a prevailing defendant in
private suits generally is not. 76 However, the rule is different when
370. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 239 (6th Cir. 1975).
371. Id. at 244.
372. See Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Van Hoomis-
sen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 180,
subsequent order, 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974); Howard v. Mercantile Commerce Trust Co.,
10 F.E.P. Cases 158 (E.D. Mo. 1974). But see Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 8 F.E.P. Cases 908 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The Waters
case relied upon the award of punitive damages by the lower court in Detroit Edison, which
was reversed by the Sixth Circuit.
373. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) (1974).
374. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The court
gave an exhaustive explanation of the guidelines to be used in determining the appropriate
compensation. Id. at 717-19.
375. Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974).
376. This rule has not been altered despite a variety of possibly mitigating factors. See
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir. 1971) (defendant presents meritorious
defenses); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971) (suit instituted as "test
case"); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 430 (8th Cir. 1970) (suit insti-
tuted as class action); Le Blanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602, 611 (E.D.
La. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1973)
(defendant acted in good faith reliance on state statute); Clark v. American Marine Corp.,
320 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(prevailing party had no obligation to pay a fee to his attorney).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the suit is instituted by the federal government. Section 706(k)
specifically provides that the United States may be liable for attor-
neys' fees as part of the costs awarded the prevailing party in a Title
VII action. "
The determination of the amount of the attorney's fee is generally
held to be within the discretion of the court,37 which often defers
determination of the award until the parties have failed to agree on
the amount.379 In fixing the amount of the award, the courts gener-
ally consider the factors which the American Bar Association's Code
of Professional Responsibility lists as proper in fixing the amount
of an attorney's fee. 38 Such fees may be awarded even when an
employee fails to prove that the employer violated Title VII, as long
as the evidence was sufficient to justify the employee's claim.3 ' In
addition to reasonable attorneys' fees, the costs of services rendered
during the course of the proceeding are also recoverable. Such costs
include fees for the prosecution of the original trial and appeal on
the merits, and fees for defending (but not for challenging on ap-
peal) the amount of such fee.382
E. ACTIONS AGAINST LABOR UNIONS
Where unions discriminate against an employee, they are denied
the right to represent all employees in the unit.3 3 The duty of the
union includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all
377. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 906 (1972).
378. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 442 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1971).
379. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
380. See, e.g., Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970), afl'd,
437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
381. Thomas v. J. C. Penney Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 319 (E.D. Tex. 1975).
382. A district court in Texas, in addition to $47,500 in attorneys' fees awarded $3,000 to
an expert witness as well as an unspecified sum for "[s]uch other and further costs which
are ordinarily taxable in litigation of this nature." Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 371 F.
Supp. 385, 394 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
383. Were we, as an arm of the Federal Government, to confer the benefits of a
certification upon a labor organization which is shown to be engaging in a pattern and
practice of invidious discrimination, the power of the Federal Government would
surely appear to be sanctioning, and indeed furthering, the continued practice of such
discrimination, thereby running afoul of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. Moreover, such action on our part would clearly be anomalous in view of the
Federal Government's express policy against such discrimination and the many laws
which prohibit it. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. 26,575. See
also Hughes Tool Co., 1964 CCH NLRB Dec. 13,250.
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members without hostility or discrimination toward any."4 A union
cannot act in a discriminatory manner in referring applicants for
employment nor can it act to prevent racial minorities or women
from qualifying for union membership." 5 The Third Circuit has
stressed the fact that a union will not always have to press an
employee's complaint through every stage of the grievance proce-
dure, but can exercise a certain degree of discretionary power to
settle or even to abandon a grievance.388 This is true even if it can
later be demonstrated that the employee's claim was meritorious.
But the exercise of such discretion cannot be affected by considera-
tions of race, sex or other factors susceptible of discriminatory
abuse.
In fashioning a remedy against a labor union which maintained,
within one bargaining unit, two separate locals segregated solely on
the basis of sex, the NLRB and a federal district court have reached
the same result but with different remedies. In one case,8 7 the Board
found that the segregation constituted an unfair labor practice and
ordered merger of the two locals and institution of a single grievance
procedure. In the district court case,388 it was found that the segrega-
tion constituted a per se violation of Title VII and payment of mone-
tary damages was ordered. The difference in remedies is due to the
statutory provision in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
that limits the power of the Board to grant broad affirmative or
compensatory relief.389 On the other hand, Title VII8 ° gives the
courts the power to fashion remedies that directly serve anti-
discrimination policies. This difference of available remedies is im-
portant since the Board and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over complaints alleging discrimination by unions. While the NLRB
has the power to grant monetary damages in certain circumstances,
the Supreme Court has held that such relief must be remedial or
384. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
385. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. 26,301. See also Miranda Fuel Co.,
1966 CCH NLRB Dec. 11,848, enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
386. Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
387. Owens-Illinois Inc., 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. 26,539, enforcement granted, 520 F.2d
693 (6th Cir. 1975).
388. Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5 F.E.P. Cases 393 (D.D.C. 1972), remanded on other
grounds, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
389. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
390. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
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compensatory, and not punitive. 9' As a result, the NLRB will only
award damages when there is specific evidence of economic injury.
The NLRB has two other remedies available: decertification of the
bargaining representative and removal of the contract bar thereby
exposing the union to the drives of rival unions. Neither of these,
however, is effective against a well-established incumbent union
that can prevail in an election and then continue its discriminatory
practices.
Contrasted with the narrow affirmative relief powers of the NLRB
are the broad powers of federal courts in Title VII suits. When
ordering merger of separate lines of progression as a remedy, the
courts have devised supplementary orders to protect minority
rights. For example, one court's order to establish a single line of
progression included specific guarantees of minority participation in
the new union."2 In Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, Inc.,5 3
qualified black city drivers who were not transferred to over-the-
road positions because of racial discrimination were relieved of pay-
ment of all union dues for a period equivalent to the length of time
that they had affirmatively sought such transfer.
Labor unions commit unlawful employment practices in violation
of section 703(c) of Title VIP 4 by negotiating collective bargaining
agreements which contain provisions discriminating against em-
ployees because of their sex.395 In such situations governed by collec-
tive bargaining agreements, a union as well as an employer is re-
391. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
392. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 536, subsequent order, 319 F. Supp.
314 (1970), re-aff'd in part, 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971). For a further discussion of
this topic see Comment, Remedies for Labor Union Sex Discrimination, 63 GEo. L.J. 939
(1975).
393. 7 F.E.P. Cases 1239 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
394. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(c) (1974).
395. A district court held that local and international unions which established seniority
and compensation plans limiting promotions and pay because of sex violated section 703(c).
See Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 329 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Pa. 1971). Retirement plans, adopted
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, which treat men and women differently with
respect to retirement age are also violations. See Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d
1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). Labor organizations are also deemed to have
violated Title VII by failing or refusing to represent fairly or process the grievances of female
employees because of their sex. See Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp.
292 (M.D.N.C. 1970). However, labor organizations do not violate Title VII by failure to
protest discriminatory state laws. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219
(C.D. Cal. 1968), afl'd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
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sponsible when, for example, the seniority system created by its
contract perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. 9
X. PROCEDURE
A. PREREQUISITES TO BRINGING A SUIT
In pursuing the right of redress for discriminatory practices,
several avenues are open to the plaintiff. Under Title VII, however,
the statutory scheme requires that certain prerequisites be met prior
to the institution of a civil action in federal court. 9
1. Initial Filing with State Fair Employment Agency
If the state or locality has a law prohibiting the challenged unlaw-
ful employment practice, the EEOC will not consider a Title VII
charge unless it has initially been filed with the state or local
agency."' Upon the expiration of sixty days following the date of
filing with that agency, the aggrieved party may file with the
EEOC. The passage of sixty days is the only condition to filing; it
is unnecessary that the state agency complete its action. However,
the party alleging discrimination need not wait the full 60 days if
proceedings before the state agency are terminated in less than 60
days by, e.g., the refusal to issue a complaint. 9' The EEOC has
officially designated over 50 state and local agencies as "Section 706
Agencies" to which it will defer."'
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has sanctioned a proce-
dure which effectively obviates the need to resort to the state
agency. In Love v. Pullman Co., 4"' the Court upheld the EEOC's
practice of accepting a charge simultaneously filed with the state
agency, that was investigated after the expiration of sixty days with-
out requiring that a new charge be filed. This case does not necessar-
ily imply that an individual or class of individuals claiming discrim-
396. United States v. Time-DC, Inc., 11 F.E.P. Cases 66, 78 (5th Cir. 1975). See also
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 61-62 (5th Cir. 1974).
397. For a complete discussion of the nonapplicability of these Title VII prerequisites to
section 1981 suits see Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions,
10 U. RiCH. L. REV. 339 (1975).
398. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c)(1974). Virginia has no such state equal employment law.
399. Id. § 2000e-5(d). For a new state or local law, the 60 day period is enlarged to 120 days
during the first year after its effective date. Id.
400. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(m) (1975).
401. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
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ination can bypass the state agency by filing with the EEOC follow-
ing the expiration of the state filing period. The Tenth Circuit has
held to the contrary. In Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp. ,402 the New
Mexico state law had required that a charge be filed with the New
Mexico Human Rights Commission within ninety days of the oc-
currence of the alleged unlawful employment practice.113 The em-
ployee failed to file with the state agency, but 144 days after resign-
ing from her job with the employer, she filed a charge with the
EEOC. The court ruled that the charge must be dismissed as being
untimely filed, since the employee did not afford "the state commis-
sion a bona fide opportunity to act upon the claims. '4 4
The charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after
the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. This
period is extended or tolled when the aggrieved employee actively
pursues his other remedies. If, as is required in states and localities
with their own fair employment commissions, a charge has been
filed with the state or local commission, then the 180 day period for
filing with the EEOC is extended to either (a) 300 days after occur-
rence of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or (b) 30 days
after receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated
the proceedings under the state or local law, whichever is earlier."5
The Eighth Circuit has held that an individual who files a charge
with the state fair employment agency within 180 days of the
alleged discriminatory act may take advantage of the 300 day
period, even if the state limitations period is less than 180 days.0
A timely state filing is not required to obtain the benefit of the
extended filing period with the EEOC. Likewise, where filing a
charge with the EEOC has been delayed because of recourse to the
grievance machinery of a collective bargaining agreement, the
charge will not be dismissed as untimely. The EEOC's statute of
limitations is tolled "while an employee in good faith pursues his
contractual grievance remedies in a constructive effort to obtain a
private settlement. 40 7
402. 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972).
403. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-9A (Supp. 1971).
404. 470 F.2d at 975.
405. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (1974).
406. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 27, 29 (8th Cir. 1975).
407. Malone v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 457 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
See also Sanchez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 499 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1974).
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2. Procedural Timetable for Processing a Charge
Title VII provides that the employer, once the charge has been
filed with the EEOC, must be notified within ten days that the
charge has been filed."' But due to the heavy backlog of cases at the
EEOC, courts have excused delays of as long as one year in giving
notice that a charge has been filed. One court justified the delay by
explaining that giving the employer notice only when the EEOC is
ready actually to proceed with the case will minimize employer
reprisals."°
The EEOC must investigate to determine whether there is reason-
able cause to believe that an unfair employment practice has been
committed. '0 In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the
Commission is required to "accord substantial weight" to final find-
ings and orders issued by state or local authorities and is under a
duty to make its determination on reasonable cause as promptly as
possible and, if practicable, within 120 days of the filing of the
complaint. ' If the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the unfair employment practice exists, "the Commis-
sion shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and
persuasion. 41 2 Having obtained no conciliation agreement from the
employer within 30 days, it may sue in federal district court.4 13
However, if no reasonable cause exists and the charge is dismissed,
then the Commission must so notify the aggrieved employee and
give him notice of his right to bring a civil action.414 An employee
may pursue his remedy under section 706(e) through the federal
courts, even though the EEOC has found no reasonable cause to
believe that the employee's allegations of discrimination are true.4"5
408. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (1974).
409. Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972). See also EEOC v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1329 (D. Del. 1974).
410. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (1974).
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(3). The Commission may still decline suit because of its case load
or some other reason.
414. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC has 180 days in which to sue. The notification is by a
notice-of-right-to-sue letter and the aggrieved party then has ninety days in which to sue.
415. Fakete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970). This is true even in
a class action suit. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
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Should the EEOC decide to sue, the suit is not limited to the
practices complained of in the charge. In EEOC iv. Raymond Metal
Products Co.,416 an employee charged that in a recall from a layoff
he was discriminated against because of his Greek national origin.
After investigation, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe not
only that national origin discrimination existed, but also that the
employer discriminated on the grounds of race and sex. Upholding
the broadening of the investigation, the federal court ruled that the
scope of the complaint filed' in court to commence the judicial pro-
ceedings is defined by the scope of the EEOC's investigation; it is
not limited to the subject matter of the original charge filed with
the EEOC. 417
3. Conciliation Proceedings by EEOC
Some cases have held that an aggrieved party must first give the
EEOC the opportunity to conciliate the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice before he may bring a civil action under Title VII.41 8
An actual attempt at conciliation by the EEOC, however, is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of a civil action by an
aggrieved party, 419 though it is a condition precedent which the
EEOC usually satisfies before it can bring suit against an employer
or union.4 2
4. Exhaustion and Election of Remedies Under Title VII
Title VII does not expressly provide that it is the exclusive remedy
for racial discrimination in employment. Therefore, the courts have
had to decide whether the failure of a plaintiff to exhaust his reme-
dies under Title VII will bar his right to bring suit under section
1981. The courts were divided prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 421 Some held exhaustion
of Title VII procedures was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
maintenance of a section 1981 action, reasoning that Title VII was
416. 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974).
417. Id. at 915.
418. See, e.g., Mickel v. South Carolina State Empl. Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967).
419. See, e.g., Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
420. EEOC v. Container Corp., 352 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
421. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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not intended to be an exclusive remedy for employment discrimina-
tion and did not repeal, amend nor pre-empt section 1981.22 Others,
while not directly confronted with the problem, reached the same
result by holding that a plaintiff who was barred from Title VII
action by a jurisdictional defect could still rely upon section 19 8 1.11
The rationale of courts holding the conflicting view was that na-
tional policy reflected in Title VII was to encourage resort to the
EEOC for nonjudicial resolution of complaints, even during the
pendency of a section 1981 action. The plaintiff should be able to
bypass Title VII only when resort thereto would be ineffective. 4
The Supreme Court apparently resolved this conflict in holding that
the remedies under Title VII and section 1981 are "separate, distinct
and independent" although directed toward the same objectives.4
Although Title VII does not impose a jurisdictional barrier to a
section 1981 suit, the availability of EEOC conciliation is still a
factor that may be considered by the court when exercising its dis-
cretion in granting equitable relief.42 Parties are not barred from
Title VII proceedings by an election of remedies either. An aggrieved
employee may seek more than one remedy, as long as he does not
recover twice for the same injury.42 A Title VII action in a federal
422. See, e.g., Hill v. American Airlines, Inc., 479 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1973), which is
representative of these cases holding that section 1981 is a completely independent remedy.
423. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
948 (1971).
424. See, e.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 83 (1971), subsequent order,
365 F. Supp. 468 (D. Colo. 1973).
425. 421 U.S. at 461.
426. See, e.g., Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). Several
reasons are cited on behalf of the proposition that administrative remedies should be ex-
hausted. One reason parallels the federalism theory, in that federal courts do not wish state
remedies bypassed. It is thought that the administrative procedure is efficient in disposing
of many cases the courts would otherwise hear. Another reason is that state agencies generally
act more quickly than the courts and have an expertise from dealing with cases of the same
type. There is a well-recognized exception to the requirement that state administrative
remedies be exhausted, primarily, that exhaustion is not necessary if the remedy is inade-
quate or would prove ineffective.
There are also reasons for not requiring exhaustion. Many Title VII cases contain constitu-
tional issues, and no state agency has more expertise in this area than the federal courts.
Efficiency, so the argument runs, should not be of primary importance where constitutional
issues are involved. Supporting this view is the fact that compliance with state protective laws
is not a valid defense in Title VII cases, so that state agencies should not prevail over the
federal courts. For a further discussion see Note, Exhaustion of State Administrative Reme-
dies Under the Civil Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REv. 565 (1975).
427. See, e.g., Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973).
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district court is not foreclosed where a complaint is first submitted
to final arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. The
plaintiff meets the prerequisite of a Title VII action when he "(1)
[has] filed timely a charge of employment discrimination with the
EEOC and (2) received and acted upon the commission's statutory
notice of the right to sue.' ' 42
5. Pattern or Practice Suits
Sections 707(a) and (c) of Title VI19 authorize the EEOC to
bring suit, without waiting for a prior charge to be filed, against an
employer that the Commission has reasonable cause to believe is
engaging in a "pattern or practice" of discriminatory employment
practices. Section 707(a) provides that the district court can grant
a permanent or temporary injunction against the practice. Further-
more, back pay may be ordered to remedy the pattern of discrimina-
tion.4 3° A pattern and practice of discrimination is established when
it can be shown that: (a) virtually all-white unions and apprentice-
ship committees have a discriminatory reputation in the Negro
community; (b) they have historically not had Negro members or
participants in work referral and apprenticeship training; and (c)
there are a significant number of Negroes qualified for membership,
work referral and apprenticeship training.431
6. Duplicitous Suits
For the first eight years of its existence, the EEOC had great
difficulty in administering Title VII. In 1972, the EEOC was granted
the power to enforce the Act by enabling it to bring suit against
private employers charged with discrimination. Not only could the
EEOC attack violations of the Act, but it could also, through the
threat of court action, encourage employers to participate seriously
in conciliation efforts expected to lead to increased voluntary com-
pliance with the Act.
This new civil enforcement power has been given different
interpretations by the courts. The most serious threat appears in
428. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
429. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6(a),(c) (1974).
430. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973). See also United
States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 5 F.E.P. Cases 492 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
431. United States v. IBEW Local 357, 356 F. Supp. 104 (D. Nev. 1972). Similar considera-
tions apply in other areas of discrimination as well.
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EEOC v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,432 which barred the EEOC
from suing employers against whom a private party has already
initiated a court action, when both suits are based upon the same
charge of employment discrimination. Once the charging party has
filed suit, the 1972 amendments accord the EEOC authority to seek
only permissive intervention. Because the EEOC has an enormous
backlog of charges pending before it, the charging party will almost
always be able to bring an action before the EEOC has completed
its administrative process. The practical significance of this new
ban on "duplicitous suits" is that Congress' grant of civil enforce-
ment power is effectively nullified except when the charging party
is either unable or unwilling to bring suit himself.
One of the most basic administrative procedures under Title VII
is that an aggrieved party may not begin by filing suit himself, but
must first file a timely charge of employment discrimination with
the EEOC, and receive permission from the EEOC in the form of a
notice of right to sue in order to initiate a separate private Title VII
action . 33 The right to sue letter can be requested, however, after 180
days from the date the charge is filed. This leaves the EEOC to
attempt to secure intervention. While an aggrieved party has an
absolute right to intervene in a suit brought by the EEOC,3 4 the
EEOC is given the right to seek only permissive intervention upon
its certification that the private suit is of general public import-
ance."' Without this right, the EEOC would be completely pre-
cluded from participating in cases brought before it had investi-
gated and found reasonable cause, or had completed conciliation
efforts. In EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,43 the Fifth
Circuit noted that large groups of employees would be bound by
judgments entered in class actions brought by private parties.
Therefore, the EEOC's right to intervene could forestall an inade-
quately litigated private case from binding a whole class of potential
claimants, while its right to sue alone could not.43
432. 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
433. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f) (1974).
434. See EEOC v. Painters Local 857, 384 F. Supp. 1264 (D.S.D. 1974).
435. See section X.C.2. infra.
436. 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1974).
437. For a further discussion see Reiter, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and "Duplicitous Suits": An Examination of EEOC v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1130 (1974).
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B. PARTIES TO THE SUIT
1. Aggrieved Employees or Applicants
Any individual employee or applicant who believes himself ag-
grieved by an improper employment practice may sue.43 8 Discrimi-
natees can sue their employer under Title VII even though charges
were filed by a union in their behalf.43 Since the "aggrieved parties"
were the discriminatees, and not the union, the joinder of the union
is deemed unnecessary. A party not named in an EEOC charge but
subsequently joined as a defendant in a civil suit may not be held
liable under Title VII. 440
2. Class Action
A class action,44' a significant legal weapon available to employ-
ees, is a suit brought on behalf of a large number of individuals or
employees all of whom are alleging that they have been subject to
the same acts of discrimination. Typically, a class action initially
is brought by a few individuals and is then broadened into a class
action when it becomes apparent that there are numerous potential
claims outstanding. The goal of the class action device is to facili-
tate the handling of an otherwise complex, protracted and repetitive
series of cases.
In order to maintain a class action, the four prerequisites set out
in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be satis-
fied. 44 These requirements are characterized as numerosity, com-
monality, typicality and representativity. A recent case 4 3 exempli-
fies how courts determine whether the four prerequisites are satis-
fied. As to numerosity, the court observed that the potential class
438. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1974).
439. Atkinson v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 710, 712 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
440. Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 537 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
441. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
442. The four prerequisites are:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
In addition to these prerequisites, a class action is improper unless at least one of the three
subsections in Rule 23(b) can be satisfied.
443. Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing Co., 8 F.E.P. Cases 383 (D.S.C. 1974).
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could be as large as 3,000 employees which clearly made joinder
impossible. The requirement of commonality was met since the suit
was an "across the board" attack on employment practices, the
allegation of racial discrimination constituting a common question
of fact to be resolved. Typicality meant that individual claims
which are not considered would be similar to those with which the
court and parties were concerned. The court noted that depositions
from the thirteen named plaintiffs challenged many aspects of the
company's employment practices. Therefore, even though the class
of employees which the thirteen named plaintiffs claimed to repre-
sent could be as large as 3,000 individuals, the hypothetical claims
of other unnamed aggrieved individuals would be covered by the
allegations made by the named plaintiffs. Representativity required
that the class plaintiffs fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class. This means that there must be no possibility of class
members whose interests are antagonistic to the plaintiff. In order
to ensure fair representation, the court determined that six sub-
classes were necessary. The six subclasses were constituted on the
basis of the union involved, which department the employees
worked in, whether the individuals were applicants or employees
rejected for promotion, who was employed as of July 2, 1965 (the
effective date of the Act), who was a union member from that date,
and who was employed or refused employment after that date."'
The Fifth Circuit, in Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,"' recog-
nized that the class action device is particularly adaptable to situa-
tions involving discrimination in employment. The named plaintiff
in such an action functions as a private attorney general by permit-
ting a privately instituted suit to further the public interest of elimi-
nating employment discrimination. The courts are taking an expan-
sive view of the class that a plaintiff might properly represent." A
plaintiff need not assert a claim factually identical with those of the
class members that he purports to represent. As stated in Oatis,
class membership is extended to all parties who "assert the same
or some of the issues" asserted by the representative in the charge
filed with the EEOC. 447 It is also unnecessary for each member of
444. Id. at 384-85.
445. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
446. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (1969), rehearing
on other grounds, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (discharged).
447. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
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the class to file a charge with the EEOC. The only charge required
is that filed by a named plaintiff with the EEOC and only that
charge must comply with the time limits delineated in the Act. One
of the few remaining restrictions on representation is that the repre-
sentative must not be remote in time to the proposed members of
the class. 48
The Fifth Circuit adheres to a broad rule that allows the court to
look beyond the individual claims whenever the requested relief is
applicable to a class and to determine whether the suit involves an
overall attack on prohibited discrimination.449 This is true even
when the complaint is phrased in individual terms. This view, how-
ever, is not universally accepted. 5 The petition generally must
comply with certain formalities in order to be the proper vehicle for
obtaining class-wide relief. In Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,4"'
the court said that if a class action is to be maintained, it must be
identified as such and must lay the predicate for class relief. Neither
the factual circumstances relevant to the class nor the members of
the class, however, need be expressed. 45 2
In enacting the 1972 amendments, Congress expressed the view
that there was no intention to alter the use of class actions in Title
VII cases as a means of securing more than individual relief.413 If the
disposition of the class action benefits all employees, not all of them
need be members of the class. But if the plaintiff attacks policies
of the company in which other employees have an interest, he may
be required to join as defendants those employees whose interests
may be adversely affected by the court's determination.454 Injunc-
tive relief is not proper when the employer has totally and uncondi-
tionally terminated the prior discriminatory policy. 5 An injunction
may be issued, however, even if the company has ceased its discrim-
inatory policies, if the court is of the opinion that the wrong will be
448. Burney v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
449. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
450. See White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
451. 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971).
452. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (1969), rehearing on other
grounds, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (discharged).
453. For the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments see U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2137 (1972).
454. English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972).
455. Baham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 478 (W.D. La. 1972).
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repeated. 56 In addition to injunctive relief, the relief granted to the
class may include reinstatement and damages in the form of back
pay.45 In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 18 the plaintiff was held not
to have waived any remedy to which he may have been entitled
merely by a failure to request it at the commencement of the law-
suit; instead he had the option for additional relief as long as it was
requested before a decision was rendered. The courts are divided on
the question of whether a class action may be maintained where the
class representative requests no injunctive relief.
The fact that the plaintiff might lose on the merits does not bar
him from maintaining a class action under Rule 23.119 The courts
generally construe Rule 23 liberally in favor of class actions, some
going so far as to hold maintainable a racial discrimination suit
against a defendant class.6 '
Rule 23(c) requires the court to determine by order as soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action whether it may be
maintained as a class action.46" ' As to whether adverse class action
determinations may be immediately appealed under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, two theories are advanced: (1) appealability is required for
final resolution of certain important rights separable from rights
asserted in the main action (the "collateral order" doctrine); or (2)
appealability is required because such determinations, if unre-
viewed, would render the continuation of the lawsuit impracticable
(the "death knell" doctrine). The "collateral order" doctrine was
stated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,462 where the
Supreme Court said that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 do not disallow an
appeal from a decision which finally determines claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action. Such
is the case where the rights involved are too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appel-
late consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.
The "death knell" doctrine was developed in Eisen v. Carlisle &
456. Coleman v. Humphreys County Memorial Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 507 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
457. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
458. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
459. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (1969), rehearing on other
grounds, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (discharged).
460. See, e.g., United States v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969).
461. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
462. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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Jacquelin,46 3 wherein the court held that review should be allowed
where a district court order dismissing a class action would, if not
reviewed, be the death knell of the action, in that it would for all
practical purposes terminate the litigation. It is generally held that
this doctrine should not be liberally applied.464
The tentative settlement class is an alternative procedure to the
class action; the main difference is timing. In an ordinary class
action, the class must be formed and certified by the court before
the suit may proceed. The tentative settlement class is constituted
without judicial supervision at the time the parties negotiate a
settlement. If the parties can reach agreement, the court is asked
to approve the entire package-both the settlement and the compo-
sition of the class-as is required by law.465
C. PROVING THE CASE
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may
be done by showing: (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was re-
jected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
plainant's qualifications.46 Once a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion is made out, the burden falls upon the employer to prove that
the employment practice in question is not discriminatory. The
difficulty employers confront in defending such suits can be traced
in part to the ease with which a prima facie case of discrimination
can be made, and the inapplicability of intent to a subsequent find-
ing of liability.
In satisfying the prima facie test, the "qualification" standard
can be difficult for the plaintiff to prove. In reality, this becomes the
company's responsibility. Once any test or job qualification is
shown to disproportionately affect women or minorities, it becomes
463. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
464. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d
1206 (2d Cir. 1972). For a summary of the development of the two doctrines see Williams v.
Mumford, 511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
465. See generally Note, The Tentative Settlement Class and Class Action Suits under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1462 (1974).
466. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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the employer's burden to show that such qualification is job-
related.467 Thus, more than one court has held that a complaint of
discrimination need not allege the plaintiff actually applied for and
was rejected for a job; it is sufficient to allege that the practices of
the defendant employer were so discriminatory that a potential ap-
plicant could reasonably believe that even applying for the job was
futile.6 ' In class action suits, the prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion may be satisfied by statistics showing the underrepresentation
of minorities or females.469 Thus, such a showing is made if minori-
ties or females are employed only in lower classifications,47 or if
minorities or females are employed in significantly lower numbers
than their representation in the community.47'
1. Discovery
Courts are liberal in allowing discovery-to the point that it will
be granted if it is arguably within the scope of the plaintiff's com-
plaint. Construing the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Burns v.
Thiokol Chemical Corp.,472 a district court stated:
Past history as revealed by statistical or other empirical evidence is
relevant to a Title VII action, even if only individual relief is sought
.... despite the problem of compiling, assimilating and synthesiz-
ing voluminous employment records into cogent, responsive answers
to interrogatories, employers should not be permitted to avoid re-
sponding to such interrogatories because they invoke this burden.7
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.4" was the first case
to hold that absent, but identifiable, members of the representative
467. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
468. McDonald v. General Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Hailes v. United
Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
469. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
470. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
471. Newman v. Avco Corp., 7 F.E.P. Cases 385 (1973), subsequent order sub nom.
Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
472. 483 F.2d 300, rehearing denied, 485 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1973).
473. Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 10 F.E.P. Cases 1287, 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1975). An em-
ployer may not defer answering interrogatories on the question of whether a class action can
be maintained until the federal district court has determined whether the action may proceed
as a class action, since the interrogatories will aid the court in its determination as to the
maintenance of such action. Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 7 F.E.P. Cases 1318
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
474. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972).
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plaintiffs class, who had received notice of the pendency of the suit
but had neither elected to be excluded nor entered an appearance,
were required to submit to discovery by the defendant. In Brennan,
the court said that in addition to a party's exclusion from the class
as a sanction for his refusal to make discovery, a court may also
impose the more severe sanction of dismissing with prejudice the
claims of that party.47 5 On the other hand, some cases have denied
a defendant's motion seeking discovery from absent plaintiffs of the
class. In Fischer v. Wolfinbarger,75 the court stated that the reason
for Rule 23 would fail if members of a class were treated in all
respects as if they were parties plaintiff.
An employer being sued under section 1981 and Title VII will not
be compelled to identify sources of information relied upon in an-
swering interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff.477 In addition a
protective order limiting the EEOC's discovery may be granted to
an employer being sued by the EEOC under Title VII. In one case,
however, the court denied a protective order, agreeing with the
plaintiff who contended that expert testimony concerning tests used
by the defendant would not otherwise be available through the use
of independent experts. 78
2. Intervention
Section 705(e)(5) of Title VIP7 9 confers upon the EEOC power "to
intervene in a civil action brought by an aggrieved party against a
respondent other than a government, governmental agency or politi-
cal subdivision." On the strength of this provision, the courts will
allow the EEOC to intervene in employees' actions against employ-
ers and unions, since the disposition of the case may be materially
aided by the EEOC's expertise in the field.48 Whether an applica-
tion to intervene is brought pursuant to Federal Rule 24(a) (inter-
vention as of right) or 24(b) (intervention by permission), it must
be timely filed. In EEOC v. United Air Lines,4"' it was held that
permissive intervention may be refused for lack of timeliness when
475. Id. at 1003.
476. 15 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 905 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
477. Winfrey v. General Motors Corp., 7 F.E.P. Cases 215 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
478. Crockett v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974).
479. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (1974).
480. See Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 1070 (D. Del. 1974).
481. 10 F.E.P. Cases 909 (7th Cir. 1975).
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discovery had been ordered closed at the time the motion to inter-
vene was filed.
Section 706(e) (1)482 gives an aggrieved employee an absolute right
to intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC. Again, such
intervention must be timely. In Nevilles v. EEOC,4  the court held
that a motion to intervene made more than two months after the
entry of a consent decree was not timely made. Among the factors
the judge should take into consideration on the question of timeli-
ness are "how far the proceedings have gone when the movant seeks
to intervene . . . ; prejudice which resultant delay might cause to
other parties . . . ; and the reason for the delay ... .
In addition, for intervention under Rule 24(a) (2), applicants must
show a protected interest relating to the subject matter of the litiga-
tion and that their ability to assert their claims would be impaired
by the denial of intervention.485 Intervention will only be allowed
when the party seeking to intervene is likely to contribute to the
question of the rights of the individuals to employment. 41 Under
Rule 24(b), intervention will only be permitted if the adjudication
of the rights of the parties will not be unduly delayed or prejudiced.
Intervention has been denied where the motion to intervene was
filed six weeks prior to the date set for trial and the complaint in
the action was filed three years before.417
3. Joinder
If an action against a union as well as against management is
brought, failure to name the union in the charges filed with the
EEOC entitles the union to summary judgment under Rule 19 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Absent this necessary party,
when the suit involves some aspect of the collective bargaining
agreement, the employee may not seek injunctive relief against the
employer.4 The principle of law as set forth in LeBeau v. Libby-
Owens-Ford Co.419 was based on Rule 19, which requires two sep-
482. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1974).
483. 511 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1975).
484. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973).
485. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
486. Smiley v. City of Montgomery, 350 F. Supp. 451 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
487. Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 466 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1972).
488. Johnson v. Thomson Brush Moore, Inc., 7 F.E.P. Cases 921 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
489. 484 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1973).
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arate but interrelated inquiries: (1) whether the absent party is a
person "to be joined if feasible;" (2) if not feasible, whether the
court in equity and good conscience should allow the action to pro-
ceed or treat the absent party as indispensable. The desirability of
joining a party depends on whether complete relief can be granted
in his absence, and whether his interests will be prejudiced or those
already parties will be subjected to a substantial risk of incurring
inconsistent obligations. Where joinder is desirable but not feasible,
the Rule provides great flexibility for determining whether the suit
should be dismissed, or the relief shaped to avoid such prejudice. A
successor employer, not properly joined in court proceedings, may,
nevertheless, be held liable if certain conditions are met.49
4. Venue
Congress intended "to limit venue to the judicial districts con-
cerned with the alleged discrimination . *.". ."I" As stated in
Ashworth v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,49 2 "Title VII actions are governed
by a 'special' venue provision,""49 which represents a conscious at-
tempt by Congress to put to one side the usual balance of conveni-
ence test as it may pertain to transfers among divisions within a
district.494 The statute provides that an action brought in the United
States District Court may be instituted in the judicial district where
the alleged unlawful employment practice was committed, where
490. The Sixth Circuit has stated these conditions:
(1) whether the successor company had'notice of the charge, (2) the ability of the
predecessor to provide relief, (3) whether there has been a substantial continuity of
business operations, (4) whether the new employer uses the same plant, (5) whether
he uses the same or substantially the same work force, (6) whether he uses the same
or substantially the same supervisory personnel, (7) whether the same jobs exist under
substantially the same working conditions, (8) whether he uses the same machinery,
equipment and methods of production and (9) whether he produces the same product.
EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir. 1974).
491. Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969).
492. 10 F.E.P. Cases 670 (E.D. Va. 1974).
493. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1974).
494. 10 F.E.P. Cases, 670, 671 (E.D. Va. 1974). The court went on to say:
To facilitate the redress of Civil Rights deprivations, Congress favored Title VII plain-
tiffs with a wide and unfettered discretion in choosing a forum within a district in order
to 'afford them greater convenience' and enable them 'to avoid potential local eco-
nomic and political pressures.' A Title VII plaintiff may bring his or her suit in any
division of any district where the cause of action arose and that decision must not only
be given great weight, it must be left undisturbed. This special venue statute may,
indeed, encourage forum shopping, but that is apparently what Congress intended. Id.
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the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained,
where the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged
unlawful employment practice, and if the respondent is not found
within any such district, where the respondent has his principal
office."'
5. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Whether a prior judgment will bar a subsequent action under the
doctrine of res judicata is determined by certain criteria. As set forth
by the Fifth Circuit a plea of res judicata requires that the prior
judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; that
there was a final judgment on the merits; that the parties, or those
in privity with them, were identical in both suits; and that the same
cause of action was involved in both suits. These elements being
established, the judgment or decree upon the merits in the earlier
case is an absolute bar to the subsequent action or suit, not only in
respect of every matter which was actually offered and received to
sustain the requested relief but also as to every ground of recovery
which might have been presented.49 An employer who has been
charged by an individual in an unsuccessful Title VII action cannot
then be sued by the EEOC on the same charge. However, the EEOC
may sue the employer to bring an end to discriminatory practices
discovered during its investigation of the previous charge.49
Collateral estoppel prevents issues that have been litigated in a
prior action from being brought again in a new action.498 The court's
judgment acts as an estoppel, limiting any future actions between
the parties to matters not covered in the first action. For the doc-
trine to be invoked, the issue raised must be identical to that in-
volved in the prior action, the issue must have been actually liti-
gated in the prior action, and the determination in the prior action
must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.499
6. Jury Trial
An overwhelming majority of courts have denied the right to jury
495. Ford v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1974).
496. Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 10 F.E.P. Cases 1386, 1389 (5th Cir. 1975).
497. EEOC v. Hutting Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975).
498. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
499. James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458-59 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
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trial in Title VII actions.'"' The most common rationale has been
that the available remedies are equitable and, therefore, place the
action beyond the reach of the seventh amendment."' Title VII
contains no express provision regarding the right to a jury trial for
alleged civil violations of the Act,"0 ' but does provide for a jury in
criminal contempt cases." 3 The language of section 706(g)-that
"the court" is empowered to "enjoin the respondent" and order
appropriate "affirmative action" -sustains the conclusion that
Congress did not intend to provide for jury trials in Title VII civil
cases. Also, the legislative history suggests that section 706(g) was
modeled after section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
which Congress knew did not provide the right to a jury trial." 4
7. Adjustment of Disputes
Conforming to the policy of encouraging settlements in Title VII
actions, the Second Circuit has said that the scope of review on
appeal of a settlement is limited to determining whether the federal
district court in approving the settlement abused its discretion."0 5
The appellate courts usually find such not to be the case.0 Similar
deference is usually accorded consent decrees."' The Third Circuit
found no abuse of discretion when the lower court approved a settle-
ment granting a plaintiff a "very small percentage of claimed back
pay." The appellate court noted that an evaluation of the probable
outcome of the litigation must be balanced against the probable
costs, in both time and money, of continued litigation.0 ' This was
so even though the plaintiffs appeared to have a prima facie case of
discrimination.
Before the EEOC can bring judicial action, notice must be served
500. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (1969), rehearing
on other grounds, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (discharged).
501. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ala.
1973).
502. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
503. Id. § 2000h. See, e.g., Ponce v. City of Tulane, 7 F.E.P. Cases 113 (Cal. Super. 1973).
504. For a further discussion see Comment, Jury Trial in Employment Discrimination
Cases-Constitutionally Mandated?, 53 TExAS L. REV. 483 (1975).
505. Patterson v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union, 10 F.E.P. Cases 349 (2d Cir. 1975).
506. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Educ., 496 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1974).
507. See, e.g., Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
508. Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1974).
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on the offending employer and the EEOC must investigate the
charge." 9 It is the duty of the EEOC to inform the employer that
charges may be settled through conciliation, and to make an effort
to achieve such conciliation. If the employer ignores the opportunity
to conciliate, or does not negotiate in good faith, the EEOC may end
its attempt to settle the case by these means. Notice of the termina-
tion of the conciliation efforts must be given to the employer, who
may then decide to reopen negotiations. In EEOC v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co.,51° the court placed an affirmative duty upon the
EEOC at least to bring to the attention of the employer/respondent
named in the charge that an opportunity exists for resolution of the
charge by conciliation and to invite the employer/respondent to
participate in procedures designed to lead to conciliation. Letters
notifying the parties of the Commission's effort to conciliate must
be sent "before or concomitant with the beginning of efforts to
conciliate."'
A consent decree is the contract of the parties entered upon the
record with approval and sanction of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. Such contracts cannot be modified or set aside without the
consent of the parties thereto, except for fraud or mistake; in
order to vacate such a judgment, an independent action must be
instituted. The courts recognize that consent decrees by which the
litigants agree to resolve the dispute over discrimination may be
vulnerable on various grounds, including:
[A]lleged illegality, ...venue deprival; lack of advance notice;
enforcement by violators; insufficiency of relief; direct interference
509. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (1974).
510. 366 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D. Md. 1973).
511. Id. at 278 (emphasis in original). A typical letter inviting a party to enter into concilia-
tion discussions with the EEOC was set forth in EEOC v. Lithographers Local 2P, 10 F.E.P.
Cases 1080, 1080-81 (D. Md. 1975):
The Commission hereby invites your participation in conciliation discussions pur-
suant to section 706(b) of the Act as amended .... Your failure to notify the Commis-
sion within seven (7) days of receipt of this letter of your intent to so participate will
indicate that you do not wish to engage in conciliation discussions. In that event, the
matter will be referred to the Commission's general counsel for appropriate action.
The purpose of this letter, said the court
is to insure that the central role of conciliation in the Congressionally adopted scheme
of Title VII is fulfilled. Where, however, the defendant had received notice on two prior
occasions that failure of conciliation would bring suit and, on those two prior occasions
the defendant had not responded on the first occasion but did respond on the second
and attended a meeting which was unproductive, the requirements discussed in Fire-
stone [366 F. Supp. 273 (1973)] have been fully vindicated. Id. at 1081.
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with rights of individuals to file, maintain or pursue individual reme-
dies; and a renunciation of statutory responsibility by executive
agencies. 52
Therefore, the courts unquestionably reserve "jurisdiction of [the]
cause for the purpose of issuing subsequent orders, consistent with
the principles of due process, as necessary to further the purposes
and objectives of these decrees.15 13
XI. ENFORCING AGENCIES
A. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is an
autonomous federal agency created by Title VII and charged with
the compliance and enforcement of Title VII.51 The five member
Commission sits in Washington, but there are seven Regional Of-
fices situated throughout the country. Each EEOC Regional Office
includes within its jurisdiction two to six district offices.
Application of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act in the
enforcement of Title VII is difficult because of the Act's intricate
substantive and procedural requirements5 ' and the Supreme
Court's admonition that its provisions not be interpreted too liter-
ally or technically.5 6 Under Title VII, when charges are filed with
the EEOC, the alleged discriminating employer or union is notified
of the charges. The EEOC investigates the charges which, if unsup-
ported by the investigation, are dropped and the parties notified. If
the charges are supported by the investigation, the EEOC notifies
the alleged discriminator and attempts to seek a settlement correct-
ing the unlawful practices through the informal methods of confer-
ence, conciliation, and persuasion. The EEOC usually does not
maintain a Title VII action against an employer and/or union until
it has attempted and failed at a conciliation effort to reach an agree-
ment.5"7 If a conciliation agreement has not been reached within 30
days, the EEOC may bring suit or may notify a charging party that
512. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 15 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
513. Id. at 6.
514. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(a)-(g) (1974).
515. EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
516. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
517. For a further discussion see section X.A.2. supra.
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an agreement has not been reached within 180 days after the charge
was filed. Although the charging party is then authorized to bring
a private suit, the EEOC may also sue. Once a charge has been filed
with the EEOC, the Commission has authority at reasonable times
to examine any witness or copy any evidence, as well as the power
to subpoena witnesses and documents. 18
The EEOC may not maintain a Title VII action against an em-
ployer where the individual alleging discrimination has filed his own
action and the subject matter of both actions is identical. '9 The
1972 amendments to Title VII give the Commission the power to sue
in federal court on behalf of an individual or a class of individuals. 50
This added authority does not, however, shift the emphasis from
conciliation as the preferred method for correcting discrimination in
employment.2 ' The Commission has no direct power to issue any
orders, such as a cease and desist order, requiring that an employer
refrain from an unlawful employment practice.
B. THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE AND THE GENERAL
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) is under the
Department of Labor and is responsible for insuring compliance
with Executive Order 11246,52 which prohibits discrimination by
government contractors. The Order covers all government contrac-
tors, but exemptions are permitted at the discretion of the OFCC.2 3
It is not necessary that there be any formal contract,2 4 and every
company contracting with the government should consider itself
518. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-8(a),-9 (1974). The EEOC is entitled to enforcement of a sub-
poena duces tecum only insofar as it seeks evidence relating to a charge of discrimination
which was timely filed. EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968).
519. EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 8 F.E.P. Cases 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
See section X.A.6. supra.
520. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1974).
521. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1357 (6th Cir. 1975).
522. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974).
523. The Secretary of Labor may exempt contracts "involving less than specified amounts
of money or specified numbers of workers," and companies whose amount of business with
the federal government is $10,000 or less. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a) (1975). An exemption once
granted can be withdrawn when "such action is necessary or appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the order." Id. § 60-1.5(d).
524. See United States v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 8 F.E.P. Cases 1089 (E.D. La.
1974).
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covered by the Executive Order.25
It is not the intent of Executive Order 11246 to enforce compliance
by litigation. The responsibility for direct compliance has been dele-
gated by the OFCC to over a dozen federal agencies which seek to
obtain voluntary compliance by "conference, conciliation, media-
tion, or persuasion. '52 6 The General Services Administration (GSA)
is the compliance agency with which industry must deal. Under
OFCC regulations,52 the GSA may require the annual submission
by March 31 of Form EEO-1 from any employer, the value of whose
contract is at least $50,000 and who has 50 or more employees.-"
This form requires the listing of the number of minority and female
employees in each job category.59 The GSA is authorized to require
a company which is bidding or negotiating for a service contract to
state in the bid or in writing whether it has developed and has on
file at each of its establishments an affirmative action program.5 30
It may also undertake a compliance review to determine if the con-
tractor maintains nondiscriminatory hiring and employment prac-
525. The following "equal opportunity clause" must be placed in every contract:
(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The contractor will
take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees
are treated during employment without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the following: employ-
ment; upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; lay-
off or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for
training, including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to post in conspicuous
places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices to be provided
by the contracting officer setting forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause.
(2) The contractor will, in all solicitations or advertisements for employees placed
by or on behalf of the contractor, state that all qualified applicants will receive consid-
eration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(3) The contractor will send to each labor union or representative of workers with
which he has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding, a
notice, to be provided by the agency contracting officer, advising the labor union or
workers' representative of the contractor's commitments [under the Order]. Exec.
Order 11246.3 202, 3 C.F.R. 170 (1974).
526. Id. § 205, 3 C.F.R. at 172.
527. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a)(1) (1975).
528. The OFCC requires such an employer to develop a written affirmative compliance
program. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1975). For a discussion of such self-initiated affirmative action
programs see section VII supra.
529. See section Vm supra.
530. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(b)(1) (1975).
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tices and is taking appropriate affirmative action. The review is a
comprehensive analysis and evaluation of every aspect of employ-
ment policy. 3' The GSA has the right, upon reasonable notice, to
enter into the employer's property for the examination of the em-
ployer's facilities and to examine and copy books, records, account-
ing and other relevant material for the purpose of ascertaining com-
pliance with Executive Order 11246.532
If voluntary compliance cannot be satisfactorily secured, the con-
tracts may be terminated or suspended,533 and the violating con-
tractor can be barred from receiving any federal contracts in the
future.534 The OFCC and its enforcing agencies such as the GSA do
not have the power to sue in court for enforcement of Executive
Order 11246. The enforcing agency can only recommend to the
EEOC that appropriate proceedings, including litigation, be insti-
tuted under Title VII.53
C. THE WAGE-HOUR ADMINISTRATION
The primary function of the Wage-Hour Administration is to se-
cure enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the Wage-Hour
Law) 6 which sets the minimum wage and requires the payment of
time and one-half the regular rate of pay for overtime after 40 hours
of work in any pay period. The Wage-Hour Administration becomes
part of the discrimination enforcement mechanism in two
areas-age discrimination and equal pay. In enforcing both the
Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination Act, the Wage-Hour
Administration has authority similar to that of the EEOC. It has
broad power to inspect records and to subpoena witnesses and docu-
ments. 37 The Wage-Hour Administration, suing in the name of the
Secretary of Labor, can obtain an injunction against violation of
531. Id. § 60-1.20(a).
532. Id. § 60-1.43. Federal regulations provide that "where deficiencies are found to exist,
reasonable efforts shall be made to secure compliance through conciliation and persuasion.
Before the contractor can be found to be in compliance with the [Executive Order], it must
make a specific commitment, in writing, to correct any such deficiencies. The commitment
must indicate the precise action to be taken and dates for completion." Id. § 61-1.20(b).
533. Exec. Order 11246 § 209(a)(5), 3 C.F.R. 174 (1974).
534. Id. § 209(a)(6).
535. Id. § 209(a)(3).
536. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
537. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (Cum. Supp 1975).
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either act. 38 Under both acts, an individual may sue on his own
behalf.39
D. STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES
The large majority of states and several localities have their own
fair employment practice laws. 4 When an allegedly unlawful em-
ployment practice occurs in a state which has a state law prohibit-
ing the practice, the charge must initially be filed with the state
agency. The intent is to encourage resort to state and local fair
employment remedies. It is not necessary that the case be pursued
to a conclusion in the state agency; once 60 days have elapsed after
the filing of the charge with the state agency, the EEOC will take
jurisdiction if the charge is then filed with it. 4' The EEOC has
officially designated over 50 state or local agencies to which it will
defer.5 2
Federal law does not limit the protection available under state
laws if a particular provision of a state law provides broader protec-
tion to employees. 43 For example, many state age discrimination
laws are not limited to protecting a particular age bracket but afford
coverage to any qualified person denied an employment opportunity
because of age.54 Furthermore, state fair employment laws typically
cover all the employees of an employer of any size.545 Title VII is
limited to employers with at least 15 or more employees on the
payroll for 20 or more weeks of the year.546 State agencies have fairly
complemented the EEOC. This is illustrated by a Connecticut case
in which the state supreme court invalidated a sex classification in
employment advertising as a per se violation of state law.547 In so
holding, the court reflected the "strong authorities in the interpreta-
tion of federal legislation and that of other states." '548
538. Id.
539. Id. §§ 626(b) (1975), 216(b) (Supp. 1975).
540. See ANNOT., 44 A.L.R.2d. 1138 (1955).
541. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(d) (1974).
542. For a list of these agencies see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(m) (1975).
543. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-7 (1974).
544. See note 164 supra.
545. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
546. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-(b) (1974).
547. Evening Sentinel v. NOW, 10 F.E.P. Cases 1043 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1975).
548. Id. at 1046-47.
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E. THE COURTS-FEDERAL AND STATE
While state courts may occasionally be called upon to review the
final determination of a state fair employment agency, the tribunal
most widely concerned with enforcement of fair employment legisla-
tion is the federal district court. It may hear a case de novo, examine
every aspect of the alleged discriminatory practices, hear evidence
and expert testimony on the many-faceted issues raised under Title
VII, offer settlement agreements and actually prescribe the correc-
tive course of conduct to be pursued by the discriminating em-
ployer. It may also rule out litigation where conciliation has not
preceded it, issue consent decrees and approve settlement agree-
ments. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) vests the court with the
responsibility for determining whether a settlement was legiti-
mately arrived at and if it is "fair, adequate, and reasonable." '549
The federal district court has the power to hear the dispute once
efforts at conference, conciliation and persuasion have failed, and
to review determinations of an agency. In addition, it has broad
powers to fashion an appropriate remedy once the violation of a
right is shown.5 ' The court's discretion in this area will not be
disturbed on appeal unless abuse is shown.551 The court can and
must render decisions which will eliminate future instances of dis-
crimination and make amends for present effects of past discrimina-
tion.5 Because the trial court hears all of the evidence and sees the
witnesses, it is best able to adjudge appropriate relief.5 3 Review of
a federal district court's decision approving an agreement that set-
tled a Title VII action is limited to a determination of whether the
court abused its discretion. Settlements which will significantly
contribute to the achievement of statutory goals are encouraged,
and the district court's concept of fairness will be accepted by the
appellate tribunal where there is evidence that equitable considera-
tion was extended to all parties. 54
549. Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 50 F.R.D. 473, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). "If the pro-
posed settlement fails this test, disapproval will automatically follow despite unanimity of
consent." Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 10 F.E.P. Cases 211, 212 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
550. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
551. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 414 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S.
Ct. 1421 (1975).
552. See, e.g., United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 F.E.P. Cases 710, 749 (W.D.
Okla. 1973).
553. Naraine v. Western Elec. Co., 507 F.2d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
554. See Patterson v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union, 10 F.E.P. Cases 349 (2d Cir. 1975).
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F. THE ADMINISTRATOR
Deciding the case is merely the first step in a Title VII suit-
drafting a decree that ensures an effective and prompt end to dis-
crimination is the most important and most difficult part of the
case. A simple injunction prohibiting discrimination is insufficient;
defendants are required to take affirmative action to remedy the
effects of their past discriminatory conduct.
Under sections 706(g) and 707(a) of Title VII,111 the courts have
wide discretion to grant affirmative remedies to the extent that
goals have been imposed upon defendants. Realizing that it is diffi-
cult to supervise the enforcement of injunctions, some courts have
appointed advisory committees or administrators to supervise var-
ious aspects of their operation. The basic function of these court-
appointed officials is threefold: (a) to provide information and as-
sistance to minority workers which will enable them to take advan-
tage of the full benefits of the court order;556 (b) to deal with the
daily problems which arise under the decree, thereby preventing
major conflicts between the parties;55 ' and (c) to provide the court
with neutral expertise which can be utilized in recommending
changes in employment practices designed to effectuate the pur-
poses of the decree. 5s
The earliest use of an administrator in a Title VII context oc-
curred in Ur'ited States v. Lathers Union Local 46,111 where the
settlement agreement provided for the appointment by the court of
"an impartial person. . to implement the provisions of this Agree-
ment and to supervise its performance." The district court indi-
cated that it conceived of the administrator as a quasi-
administrative body. In a circuit court case, 6' the defendant unions
and apprenticeship committees were ordered to make specific
changes in their membership application procedures, the hiring hall
555. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-5(g), -6(a) (1974).
556. See, e.g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 5,4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971).
557. See United States v. Lathers Union, Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
558. See Rios v. Steanfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
559. 2 E.P.D. 10226, at 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
560. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971).
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system, and the apprenticeship training programs. To effectuate the
plan the court established an "Advisory Committee" of nine mem-
bers-two from labor, two from the contractors, two from the black
and one from another minority community, and one each from state
and local governments. The Committee was given responsibility for
conciliation, consultation and cooperation with the parties. In
United States v. United States Steel Corp.,56' a district court cre-
ated an "Implementation Committee" to ensure the dissemination
of information and explanations concerning the rights and proce-
dures provided for in its decree. In order to ensure fairness in a
union's admissions procedures, another district court's decree562 pro-
vided for an impartial examining board, consisting of three per-
sons-one each from the faculty of Columbia University's Engineer-
ing School, the faculty of Stevens Institute, and an aptitude testing
service-to validate and administer a job-related test to applicants
for union membership.
Court-appointed administrators function as quasi-administrative
agencies because, in addition to their role as troubleshooters, they
have power to investigate, criticize, recommend and develop practi-
cal solutions to unforeseen problems arising under a decree. Experi-
ence with the use of judicially-appointed administrators indicates
that they can perform a very useful role in supervising and enforcing
civil rights decrees.563 At the present time, the amount of authority
which can be delegated to an administrator is not entirely clear, but
it is recognized that the administrator's findings are entitled to
great weight.
G. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)564 as enforced by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), as well as by the federal
courts, prohibits employment discrimination. Most of the prohibi-
tions against discrimination under the Act are directed against
unions. If in the course of an election to determine whether a union
is to be the exclusive bargaining representative of employees, either
561. 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
562. United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
563. See J. Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case Study in Judicial Flexibility, 60
CORNELL L. REv. 53 (1974).
564. 29 U.S.C. § 161 et seq. (1970).
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union or management makes flagrant appeals to racial prejudice,
there is adequate justification for the NLRB setting the election
aside. 5 The NLRB has ruled that it will not certify a union as
exclusive bargaining agent (even though the union has won a repre-
sentational election) where such union engages in discrimination
based upon race or national origin. 6 The employer may object on
grounds of discrimination to the certification of a union within five
days after the tally of ballots is issued in a representational elec-
tion.567
Management should be aware of the NLRB policy not to certify
a union which discriminates. Yet as a practical matter, this policy
may mean little to a company which has just lost a representational
election. The indications are that the NLRB is extremely reluctant
to utilize this tool; the Board requires far stronger evidence than is
necessary for a finding of discrimination in the federal courts under
Title VII. Also, a company may find it impractical to tell a union
which has just received a majority of votes in a representational
election that it is contesting the validity of the election because the
union engages in unlawful discrimination. The NLRA places the
union under a "duty of fair representation" to all unit employees. 6
Under this doctrine, the union would violate the Act by, for exam-
ple, refusing to process the grievances of female or minority employ-
ees.
569
The District of Columbia Circuit has taken the position that em-
ployer discrimination, by its very nature, always constitutes an un-
fair labor practice because it "sets up an unjustified clash of inter-
ests between groups of workers.517 ° The NLRB takes a less adamant
position.57' According to the Board there must be actual evidence,
565. Sewell Mfg. Co., 1962 CCH NLRB Dec. 11,504.
566. Bell and Howell Co., 1974-75 CCH NLRB Dec. 15,008; Bekins Moving & Storage
Co., 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. 26,575.
567. Grants Furniture Plaza, 1974-75 CCH NLRB Dec. 15,010.
568. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944).
569. Bell and Howell Co., 1974-75 CCH NLRB Dec. 15,008.
570. Food Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903
(1969).
571. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 1973 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,127.
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rather than speculation, of the connection between the discrimina-
tory conduct and the interference with or restraint of employees'
rights to organize and to bargain collectively.
Initially an aggrieved party-a union, an employer, or an individ-
ual employee-files a charge with the Board. The NLRB will inves-
tigate, and if it finds reasonable cause to believe that such charge
is true, will issue a complaint followed by a hearing conducted be-
fore an Administrative Law Judge. The Administrative Law Judge's
determination is subject to review by the NLRB and the United
States Court of Appeals. 52
The NLRA5 3 also provides that for the purposes of all hearings
and investigations, the Board shall at reasonable times have access
to the appropriate premises to question witnesses or copy any evi-
dence. The NLRB can compel the attendance of witnesses or the
production of evidence by issuing subpoenas upon the request of
either party. If it is determined that an unfair labor practice has
been committed, the employer or the union or both may be ordered
to cease and desist from the practice. Both the Board and the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge have the authority to order that an individ-
ual or group of individuals be reinstated with back pay plus interest
for the loss of income due to the discrimination, less any amounts
earned in the interim. Still unanswered is whether an employer's
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
independently constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA
and is, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals answered this question in the affirma-
tive," while the NLRB answered it in the negative. 5 5 Legislative
history indicates that Congress, recognizing the difference between
572. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).
573. Id.
574. Food Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903
(1969).
575. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 1973 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,127. In a concurring opinion in a Board
case, member Kennedy analyzed the Supreme Court's first discussion of the duty of fair
representation as found in Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In that
decision, the Court clearly indicated that the origin of the duty of fair representation was
statutory rather than constitutional. The Court noted that a statutorily certified or recognized
labor organization was vested with exclusive authority to represent union employees. In view
of this statutory grant of exclusive authority, the Court determined, there arose a correspond-
ing duty to fairly and impartially represent each employee in the unit. See Bekins Moving &
Storage Co., 1974 CCH NLRB Dec. T 26,575. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
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Title VII and the NLRA, intended to permit concurrent jurisdiction
over employment discrimination cases under the two statutes."6
H. ARBITRATION
The unionized company should continue to remind the union of
its obligation to eradicate discrimination. In the collective bargain-
ing negotiations, some time should be spent by the parties agreeing
that the elimination of discrimination is a mutual responsibility of
the employer and the union. Assuming that the labor agreement
contains a grievance and arbitration clause, the individual who be-
lieves himself the victim of discrimination may file a grievance and
pursue the matter through to arbitration. Resorting to arbitration
is considerably less time-consuming than initiating the Title VII
machinery. Furthermore, and of great significance, the Supreme
Court has held that Title VII is an independent remedy; even if the
employee has lost his case in arbitration, he may commence a Title
VII action with the EEOC and the court.577
In hearing a claim of discrimination, the arbitrator will take into
account the applicable fair employment law as it has evolved under
Title VII. In many respects, because the grievance and arbitration
procedure is less formal than litigation and less of an adversary
procedure, it is thought that an expeditious resolution of a discrimi-
nation problem may be more satisfactory at this level. However, the
grievance and arbitration procedure may not afford a realistic rem-
edy where discrimination is alleged against an employer on behalf
of a broad class of individuals, rather than of one or two individuals.
Employees who have a claim of racial discrimination which the
union is willing to pursue under the grievance and arbitration proce-
dure of the labor contract may not use the picket line to protest the
employer's discriminatory practices. In one such case, where two
employees picketed with handbills accusing the employer of being
''racist pigs" and running a "colonial plantation," the United States
Supreme Court upheld the discharge of these employees.5 78
576. See Note, Employer Discrimination: How Far Does NLRB Jurisdiction Reach?, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 1078 (1974).
577. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
578. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comm. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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Although arbitration is desirable at first glance, it is an extremely
limited method of enforcement against discrimination for various
reasons. First, the union must agree to proceed, or may, because of
its responsibility to represent its members properly, deem itself
impelled to proceed under penalty of an action by the individual
union member. 59 Since arbitration is generally available only at the
request of either management or the union, it has not been a popular
device for enforcement of civil rights claims initiated by individual
employees. Second, the entire arbitration system has been the
object of severe criticism because of inherent problems including
lack of experienced arbitrators, the fear of bias, the inability to
appeal awards, and the skepticism that surrounds the choice of
arbitrators. The arbitrators themselves are subject to question-
whether they are liberal or conservative, whether they will predi-
cate the award upon the merits or upon an interest in future ap-
pointments,"' and in general whether they lack dedication since
their conduct is amenable to no tribunal. While arbitration can and
does save time and expense, these factors have lessened its popu-
larity in the area of civil rights.
The courts have used several rationales when declining to defer
to arbitration awards in Title VII actions: the task of the arbitrator
is to effectuate the intent of the parties while the task of the courts
is to effectuate the purposes of legislation; the specialized compe-
tence of the arbitrator pertains primarily to the law of the shop
while that of the courts pertains to the law of the land; and the
arbitral and judicial fact-finding processes are different. The Su-
preme Court, refusing to defer to arbitration, made clear that while
it has upheld and continues to uphold the arbitration system, Title
VII strongly suggests that one does not forego a private cause of
action by first resorting to arbitration.'
Even though an aggrieved employee has initiated a grievance
procedure because of her charge of alleged sex discrimination and
an impartial arbitrator after a full and fair hearing denied her alle-
gations, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiff a full trial upon the
579. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
580. "The tendency of arbitrators to favor industrial needs over civil rights advancement
is largely the result of personal motivations and pressures." Kovarsky, Civil Rights and
Arbitration, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 59 (1974).
581. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
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issues raised by the complaint. 2 While arbitrators' awards are not
binding in court since the issue stems from a separate cause of
action, they are admissible as evidence5"' and may have a persuasive
effect upon the outcome of the judicial proceeding. This fact has
engendered suggestions that a more satisfactory arbitration proce-
dure be implemented.
XII. CONCLUSION
Title VII is the most comprehensive anti-discrimination legisla-
tion enacted to date. Not only does it ban discrimination in hiring,
job mobility and discipline, whether for sex, color, religion or na-
tional origin, it also prescribes remedial action which may be taken
by a number of tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction. In its all-
encompassing scope it need defer to no agency, state or arbitrator,
and by its fiat, federal courts are commanded to fashion remedies
to correct past, and avoid future discriminatory practices. Its failure
to cover age discrimination is corrected by an additional law so that
no gap is left in the fabric of applicable legislation. As a safety valve,
employers should resolve doubts with a cautious eye, casting no
reliance on traditional defenses of good faith.
Title VII is not without its defects. The current legislative struc-
ture provides overlapping jurisdiction which results in conflicting
opinions and administrative delays. As in the case of most social
legislation, ideological considerations seem to prevail over the prag-
matic. But as the law matures and its application is viewed in
proper perspective, a delicate balancing of interests becomes more
evident. Equalization of employment opportunity is slowly but
surely becoming the accepted practice.
582. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973).
583. See Oppenheim, Gateway and Alexander- Whither Arbitration, 48 TUL. L. REV. 973
(1974).
[Vol. 10:209
